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VENTUJRE CAPITAL ON THE DOWNSIDE: 
PREFERRED STOCI( AND CORPORATE 
COl\JTROL 
William W. Brotton * 
INTROD UCTION 
When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup 
companies fizzl e out, and when it stops raining money on places like 
Wall Stree t and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside 
contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in the back seat as mere 
facilit ators on the upside, move up to the front and sometimes even 
take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside: 
to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily 
on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be 
separated from dysfunctional teams of business people to stem the 
flow of red ink to disappointed investors. The team members rarely go 
quietly , no matter how unsuccessful. The outcome can turn on 
provisions in contracts entered into on the upside - cookie-cutter 
paragraphs in boilerplate forms, barely noticed when the cash flows 
easily. 
This Article takes the occasion of the simultaneous collapse of the 
high technology stock market and the failure of the dot-com startups, 1 
along with the subsequent retrenchment of the venture capital 
business ,2 to examine the law and economics of downside 
arrangements in venture capital contracts. The subject matter 
implicates core concerns of legal and economic theory of the firm. 
Debates about the separation of ownership and control ,-' relational 
Samuel Tyler R esearch Professor of Law, The George Washington U ni versity Law 
School ; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Unive rsity Law Cente r. A.B. 1973 . 
Columbia; J.D. 1976. Columbia. - Ed. My thanks to John Armour. Mitu Gula ti , William 
Kl ein , Joe McCahery, La rry Mitchell , Per Stromberg. and participants a t the TI AS Business 
School confe rence o ne-business for comments on prev io us versio ns. 
1. In the first seven months of 2001 , 367 in te rne t compa nies we nt out of business. and 
nearl y 83,000 dot-com employees were la id off. One result was a ma rked uptick in 
a pplications to business school. Big Ex- Techies On Campus. Bu s . WK .. A ug. 13,2001, at 8. 
2. See Mark HeinzL Srarting Gate, W ALL ST. L July 16.2001 , at B5 (repo rting that U .S. 
ve nture capita l inves tm ents in the first quarter of 2001 we re $11.7 billion compared to $26.7 
billio n in the first quarter of 2000). 
3. See, e.g .. Mi chael C. Je nsen, Th e tV/adem !ndusrria/ Revollllion, Exir, and rhe Failure 
of In rerna / Control Sysrems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993) (arguing th a t inte rnal govern a nce systems 
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inves ting,-! takeove r policy, the law and cconomtcs of debt 
capitalizati o n." and bankru ptcy reform /' all grapple with the downside 
problem of controlling and termina ting unsuccessful manage rs for the 
benefit o f o utside debt and equity investors (and the re la ted upside 
problem o f incenti vizing e ffective but fallibl e manage rs). The fa cto rs 
motivating these debates a lso bear on venture capital contracting. But 
ve nture capital p rese nts a special puzzle for solution. Conve rtibl e 
preferred stock is the do minant financi a l contrac t in th e ven ture 
capital marke t,7 at least in the United States.8 This contrasts with othe r 
contexts in corpora te fin ance, where preferred stock is tho ug ht to be a 
fin ancin g ve hicle long in decline. The only mature firms tha t fin a nce 
with pre ferred, which once was ubiquitous in America n capital 
structures , tend to be firm s in regulated industries having littl e cho ice 
in the ma tte r. T ax rules favoring debt fin ance provide the prim a ry 
explanation for pre ferrecl" s decline. But many corporate law observe rs 
wo uld sugges t dys function al downside contracting as a co ncomita nt 
cause . Simply, pre ferred pe rforms badly on the downside, whe re 
senior security contracts supposedly are at the ir most effective. 
Preferred stockholders routinely have been victimized in distress 
situations by opportunis tic issuers who strip them of the ir contract 
rights, transferrin g value to the junior equityholders who control the 
are failing at the task of achieving the downsizing and disinvestment needed by the wider 
eco nomy) . 
-l. Set> . e.g . Michae l E. Porte r. Capilal Choices: Changing 1/z e Way A 111erica ln ves1.1· in 
!nclusi!T. in STU DIES IN INTER I'ATIONAL CO RPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERN ANCE 
SYSTE ~IS: A CO IVIPARI SON OF TH E U.S., J APA N. AND EU ROPE 5-17 (Dona ld H. Chew eel .. 
1997) (arguing fo r business Jnd law re form toward th e end of encouraging re lat iona l 
inves ting). 
5. See. e.g. . Michael C. Jens t: n. A gency Cosls of Free Cash Flo w, Corpomle Finan ce and 
Tnki'nvers. ·76 Arvl. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1986) (a rguing th a t manage rs put 
excess cash into suboptimal pro jec ts nnd need to be disciplined by high le ve rage and 
takeove rs) . 
6. See. e.g .. THOIVI AS H. JA CKSO N. TH E LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK RU PTCY 2U9-24 
( 1986) (argui ng th a t bankrupt firms should be put up for sa le as going concerns rath e r th an 
reca pita lized). 
7. See. e.g .. Willi am A. Sahlman. Th e S1ruc1ure and Governance of Vel/lure- Cap iwl 
Orgunizalions . 27 J. FI N. ECON. 473 (1990) ; Je ffrey J. Trester , Velllure Crzpilul Conlmuing 
Un der Jlsv /1/ nzelric lnf(m nmion . 22 J. BAN KI NG & FI N. 675 (1998) . 
8. Douglas J. Cumming. The Con venible Prefared Eq uity Pu zz le in Canadian Venrure 
Cu[iiflll Finun ce (SSRN Elec. Pape r Coil. No. 218352. 2001 ). m 
http ://pape rs.ssrn .com/abs tract=218352, repo rts that prefe rred is not extensive ly utili zed in 
Ca nadian ve nture ca pi ta l financing. Thi s is eve n true with respect to U.S. ve nture capital 
firm s' in vestments in Ca nada. D ouglas Cumming. Uniled Simes Vemuri' Cap ilal Financial 
Comracting: Evidence .fi·om ln ves//1/enls in Foreign Securi1ies (SSRN Elec. Pape r Coli. No. 
288111. 2002). a / http ://papers. ss rn. com/a bs trac t=28811 1. D. Gordo n Smith & Annalcc na 
Parhank agas. Conflic t JV!anagemenl in !he Em repreneur- Velllure Capita/is! Rel(l{ iomhip: A n 
lmemulional Compurmive Study (working pape r on fil e with author. June 2000) makes the 
sa me report fo r Finland. 
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firm's management. The cumulation of bad experiences adds impetus 
to a wider trend in favor of debt as the mode of senior part icipat ion . 
Venture capital finance is the exception to the trend. With 
preferred stock as the investing vehicle of choice, the numbe r of 
venture capita l funds increased from thirty-four with capital of $1.69 
billion in 1991 to 228 funds with commit ted capital of $67 .7 bill ion in 
the peak year of 2000.9 Given preferred stock's history of contract 
failure, two questions arise . Firs t, why do A merican venture capital ists 
employ preferred instead of debt or comnwn stock , and second. how. 
if at alL do venture capital preferred contracts sol ve or avoid downside 
fail ure? This A rticle draws on the economics of incomple te contracts 
to offer answers to these questions. 
T he first line of downside defe nse for any outside source of capital 
is not closing in the first place . Vent ure capital contracts employ this 
defense to the utmost, staging the c!rawclowns of funds over time and 
cond itioning the funding commitment on performance targets. If the 
stock issuer misses its targe t, the venture capitalist has the option of 
refusing fur ther funds. The venture capital ist's final line of downside 
defense lies in its preferred stock redemption rights and liquidation 
preference. Venture capital investments tend to have an intermediate 
duration. If after five years or so the stock issuer has not produced a 
payoff in the form of an initial public offering, the venture capitalist 
has the backstop right to have its stock redeemed a t the purchase 
price. That right implies a power to terminate an issuer unable to fund 
the redemption, along with priority rights respecting remaining assets. 
Between these two lines of defense there lies a middle ground 
where downside protection may also be needed. This is the ground 
taken up in this Article. Here downside protection for a venture 
capitalist means two things - first, power to replace the firm's 
managers (or, alternatively, to force premature sale or liquidation of 
the firm), and second, power to protect the ven ture contract itself 
from opportunistic amendment. Venture capital investments possess 
this protection in varying degrees, depending on the mode of their 
participation and the governing contracts' terms. At the bes t-protected 
end of the range of possibilities lie transactions where the venture 
capitalis t holds a majority of the voting shares, whether common or 
preferred. This imports control of the board and all necessary power 
to effect results in the firm. Thus situated , a holder of venture capi ta l 
preferred can block any opportunistic stripping of its priorities and 
need not overly concern itself with the completeness of the protections 
9. Paul Gompers & J os l1 Le rner. Tile Venwre Cupirul Revo/urion. 15 J. E CON. PERSP. 
145. 151, tbl.l & n.a. (2001) . For a concise overv iew of all as pects of venture capital 
contrac ting. see Michae l Klausn e r & Kate Litvak. Wlior Economisrs Have T1.1ughr Us Abour 
Venrure Capiral Conrracring (SSRN Elec. Pape r Coil. No. 280024. 2001) . or 
h ttp://pa pers.ssrn .com/a bstract=280024. 
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specified m its contracts. At the opposite, least-protected end of the 
range of possibilities lie transactions where the venture capitalist holds 
preferred in the absence of either a voting stock majority or control of 
the board of directors. With no control whatsoever, the venture 
capi ta list has the burden of extracting protection in the form of 
express tenns of the type conventional in contracts governing senior 
securities ~ promises to pay, negative covenants, liquidation 
prov1s10ns. conditions on commitments to ma ke additional 
investmen ts. and so fo rth. In many cases these provide a cumbersome , 
unre li ab le means to achieve the fundamental downside objective of 
removing m<magcrs or forc ing a sale. To sec why, consider the 
archety riccll case of a payment default on a bond con tract. This is a 
governance event because as a practical matter it forces a bankruptcy 
reorganizaticm . But Chap ter 11 is designee! in the first instance to 
prevent the remova l of managers and to avert a sale of the business. 
T he procee ding will be controlled initially by the incumbent 
management, which will be biased toward the status quo and will lack 
a strong commitment toward protecting the contract rights of senior 
securityholders. 10 
Until recently, academic observers assumed that venture capitalists 
always insist on full protection, taking voting control of their portfolio 
companies' shares and dominating their boardrooms. 11 New empirical 
work shows that venture capitalists emerge with such full control at 
both the shareholder and board level in only a significant minority of 
cases. 12 In another significant minority of cases , the venture capitalist 
emerges at the vulnerable end of the range of protection, lacking 
voting and boardroom control and relying entirely on terms 
articulated ex ante in the preferred stock contract. In these cases, a 
ri sk of exposure to issuer opportunism arises. 
This Article evaluates this risk, reviewing contract terms employed 
in venture capital transactions and the case law on preferred stock. A 
mixed pict ure emerges. The terms of venture capital contracts 
improve in significant respects on those of traditional preferred stock 
contracts. But they are not perfect , and they offer incomplete 
protection from issuer opportunism. Meanwhile , the case law is as 
hostile as ever. Delaware has taken the lead, sustaining a classic case 
of preferred stock victimiza tion in a venture capital context. This 
10. Under section l1 21(cJ of th e Bankruptcy Code. the deb tor in possession has the 
exclusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 clays of a proceeding. Section 112lJ(a) , 
(bJ co ntemplates that seniors can be as ked to give up value to juniors subject to the limit 
that seniors must at least rece ive liquidation value. 11 U.S.C. §§ 11 21(c). !129(a). (bJ ( 19l)4). 
II. See in.fia text accompanying no tes 17-20. 
12. Steven Kapla n & Per Stro mbe rg, Financial Comracting Theory 1\llee/s rhe Real 
World: / 111 Eillpiriml Analysis of Ven111re Capiwl Con/racrs . (SS RN E lec. Paper Coli. No. 
2li:> l 75. ?.OOO).ul http://pape rs.ssrn .com/abstract=2lol75. 
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Article criticizes this approach as a matter of both contract law and 
contract economics: contract law's good faith duty can be used to 
protect venture capital preferred without a cogniza ble ri sk of· 
unproductive judicial interference in corporate affairs. The discussion 
also suggests that D elaware's adherence to the traditional patterns of 
trea tment of preferred is short sighted. Venture capita l contrac ts 
prese nt a unique alignment of financial and governance interests . A 
responsive legal regime seeking venture capital incorporations will 
tailo r its contrac t and fidu ciary principles accordingly. deve loping an 
even-handed fr amework in ·which to arbitrate disputes. 
VENT URE CAPITAL C ONTRACTS - T H E C ONTROL R A NGE 
Traditional 
Contracts 
Power to Weak 
Control Assets 
Exposure to 
Contract 
Opportunism 
Yes 
Shared Control 
Incomplete 
Contracting 
I -- --- -~ 
I Full Voting I 
I Control I 
Full 
No (stock majority) No 
Yes (stock minority) 
J 
The most likely venture capital transaction structure entails neither 
full protection nor classic preferred stock vulnerability. In the majority 
of transactions, the venture capitalist emerges at a midpoint on the 
protection range, sharing control with the entrepreneur. Here the 
defining characteristic is an open-ended balance of power in the 
boardroom. The venture capitalist accordingly gets no un ilateral 
power to control the assets and terminate the entrepreneur on the 
downside. Instead these matters are left open to contest. In a majority 
of this subset of transactions, the venture capitalist takes a majority of 
the voting stock even though it does not take a majority of board 
seats. The stock majority imports determinative protection against the 
stripping of contract rights. In a significant minority of these shared-
control transactions, however, the entrepreneur holds a minority of 
the shares with control in the boardroom being shared . This 
arrangement opens up a possibility of exposure to opport unism 
respecting the preferred stock contract. 
In sum, in a majority of venture capital transactions, the venture 
capitalist takes a cognizable risk of not getting the results it vv ants on 
896 Michigon Low Revie1v [Vol. lOO:iN l 
the downside. This Article addresses the question of wh y this occurs 
using a model or optimal capital structure in startup investment 
contexts drawn from the economic literature of incomplete contracts. 
T he model, which abstracts from the leading description of control 
transfer be twee n entrepre ne urs and outside capitalists proposed by 
Phillippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton,u le ts us explain the patte rn of 
venture ca pital contract ing in terms of the rational provision of 
production incentives. '-! l'v1orc particularly , shared control 
arrangements are governance processes that avert problems of 
noncontractibi!ity. When parti es e nter into venture capital contracts 
they are in a position to legisla te respec ting some but not all future 
outcomes. Fabulous success, for example, presents allocational 
problems but no questio ns respecting the entrepreneur 's control of the 
assets in the future. Tota l fa ilure is similarly cut and dried - the 
contracts trigger liquidation for the benefit of the venture capitalist 
subject to the constra ints of the bankruptcy system. Middling 
outcomes are less amenable to advance specification. H ere , control 
transfers implicate complex business judgments outside the scope of 
existing contract technologies. Such scenarios are better suited to 
treatment through the operation of a contractually instituted 
governance processes than through advance specification of a clear-
cut outcome. Venture capital's shared control arrangements achieve 
this end, making the entrepreneur's day-to-day control of assets and 
management contestable and facilitating control transfer at low cost 
even while giving the entrepreneur some assurance that control 
transfer power will not be arbitrarily exercised. 
Part I begins by setting out recent empirical findings on venture 
capital contracts. Next. Part I articulates the terms of the control 
allocation model of optimal capital structure of Aghion and Bolton. 
Part I then brings the rea l world contracting pattern to the mode l and 
the model to the real world pattern.
1
' T his encounter expands the 
model 's framework , yielding a menu of contract specifications and 
governance processes from which parties to venture capital contracts 
13. Philippe A ghi o n & Pa trick Bolto n . A n !ncomple!e Con lraCis Approach lo Financial 
Contracting . 59 REV . ECON. STU D. 473 (1 992). In so doing. it follows the suggestion of 
Ka plan & Stromberg. sup m no te 12 . that the Aghion-B o lton m ode l is the m ost coge nt o f the 
theore tical explicatio ns o f ve nture ca pita l re la tionships. Thomas He llmann . Th e Allocation 
of Com rol Rigl11s in Venrure Capilli I Conrrucrs. 29 R AN D J. E CON . 57 (1998) . makes the sa me 
co mmenda ti on. 
14. Th e fit between the Agh io n-Bo lton construct a nd the rea l world contracting pa tte rn 
is no t precise . In orde r to ex pl a in th e a mbi guo us, sha re d contro l a rra nge me nts that d o minate 
ve nture capital contrac ting. th e mode l' s menu o f modes of contro l transfe r a nd 
dec isionma king continge ncies has to be ex panded. T hi s Articl e fills in the a clclitional menu 
ite ms. 
15. Fo r a nothe r discussion o f th e Aghi o n-Bo lton mode l and the Kapla n a nd Stro mbe rg 
res ults. see O liver H art. Finun ciol Cmztru cting . 39 J. ECON . LIT. 1079, 1084-90 (2001). 
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can se lect. We emerge with a thick but workable description of control 
rel a tionships between ve nture cap italists and entrepreneurs. 
Part II turns to the lega l environme nt and contracting practice 
respecting the prefe rred stock. ft begins by showing the ease with 
which opportunist ic managers have historicall y dive rted value from 
preferred holders. The di scussio n then turns to venture capital 
preferred , showing how histo ry repeated itself in th e Delaware courts 
in the leading case co nce rning the rights of venture capital preferred, 
Equity-Linked In vestors. L. P. v. Adoms. 1A Fin ally, Part IT returns to 
real world ve nture capi tal contracting prac ti ce and the stra tegies it 
employs to reverse the historica l pattern of preferred exposure. The 
verdict is o ne of qualified success. 
The qualification is important , given a venture capitalist averse to 
contract risk . This Article 's analysis implies conserva tive advice: 
invulnerability to issue r opportunism presupposes voting control of 
the stock and, at a mi nim um , shared control in the boardroom. In the 
present lega l context. contract protections without control remain 
unreliable. This advice is hardly sa tisfac tory as a policy matte r. 
Accordingly, the Article concludes th at the lega l framework encasing 
preferred stock has not evolved in an effici ent direction. 
I. CONTROL IN VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: FROM PRACTI CE 
TO THEORY 
This Part ga thers, evaluates, and res tates the economic learning on 
venture capital contracts. Section A sets out recently reported data on 
business practices respecting venture capital contracts. The da ta 
displace a longstanding ass umption that venture capitalists always take 
complete voting control of their portfolio companies. Section B 
describes incomple te contracts economics and expla ins its 
appropriateness as a fr amework o f inquiry respecting capital structure. 
Section C sets out a basic incomplete contracts model of a control 
transfer capital structure (the Control Transfer Model, or CTM), 
abstracting from research by the economists Philippe Aghion and 
Patrick Bolton. Sec tion 0 expands the model 's analytical framework 
so as to provide a working account of real world venture capital 
governance structures. 
A. Contracts and Control Arrangenwnts in Venture Capital Finance 
In th e once-prevailing story about venture capital transactions, 
entrepreneurs so need venture capital that they cede both a majority 
of stock and control of the boardroom. The control transfer to the 
venture capitalist ( VC) is only temporary, howeve r. If the portfolio 
16. 705 A.2cl 1040 (De l. Ch. 1097) . 
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company succeeds, control re turns to the e ntrepreneur (£) when VC 
se ils its stock in an initi al p ublic offering ("'IP0''). 17 Thus, in Ronald 
G ilson and Bernard Black's descrip tion , the problem for solution with 
venture capital contracts is E's lack of assurance against opportunistic 
retenti on of control by VC through undue de lay of the IPO. They 
suggest that an " implicit contract" backed by reputa tional constraints 
and fi nancial incentives assures E that VC will voluntaril y surrende r 
the re ins.10 Note that so long as VC has controL its senior sta tus is 
complete ly pro tected. Indeed, according to Gilson and Black, the 
pract ice in venture capital transac tions gives VC double protectio n, 
in ves ti ng it with veto power over business decisions thro ugh a full set 
of business covenants. 19 
The VC control story, however, ha:.; turned out to be incomplcte?1 
The reversal is understandable . Venture capita l transactions are 
private placements. There is accord ingly no public database respecting 
their financ ial terms and contracting structures . Actors in the industry, 
moreover, can be expected to take a proprie tary view respecting their 
transactions ' documentat ion. T he economists Kaplan and Stromberg 
have broken new ground just by gathering data respecting the 
contracts governing venture capital investments in 118 startups (200 
separate instances of investment) made by fourteen venture capital 
firms located across the country. T he data displace the standard story, 
showing that VCs do not always take control of their portfolio firms. 21 
The theory of the firm has a lot of explaining to do as a result. 
17. BernardS. Black & R ona ld J. G ilson. Venrure Capiw! and rhe Srrucru re of Capiro! 
1Vlarkers: Banks Versus Srock Markers. 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243. 253. 255-56. 2<10-61 (1998). 
18. !d. a t 257-64. 
19. !d. at 261. 
20. It also should be noted tha t the IPO is not the only meam of VC e xit on the upside . 
Four add itio nal routes are ava il able: (1) the VC can retain all or part of its shares and sell 
the m into the trading marke t subseq ue nt to the !PO: (2) the fi rm can be so ld to a thi rd-party 
acq uire r, with the VC taki ng a share of me rge r conside rat io n upo n exit: (3) the VC ca n se ll 
its sha res to a third -party acquire r : a nd (4) the VC can sel l its sha res back to the issue r o r to 
E. Any of these exits can be pa rtia l o r full. For disc ussio n of possibilities and practi ces. 
including empirical results in the U.S. a nd Ca nada. see Douglas J. C umming & J e ffrey G. 
Macintosh. Th e E.trel/( of Venlll re Cap ital Ex irs: Evidence from Canada and rhe Unired Swres 
(SSRN Elec. Paper Col i. No. 2505ll), 2000), ar http ://papers.ssrn.com /abstract=2505l 9. 
C umming an d Macintosh sugges t that the like lihood of exit increases over time: the value 
added by the VC declines as the firm matures. management becomes more seasoned. the 
firm's business contacts are put in place. and product development and marketing issues a re 
reso lved. D. Gordon Smith , Conrrol Over Exir in Venruri:' Cap ital Re!arionships (SSRN Elcc. 
Paper Co iL No. 272231. 2001) , ar http://pape rs.ssrn.com/abstract=272231) . studies the 
regul ation o f exit in venture capital contracts. show ing that th e IIC comes to acquire control 
ove r exi t over time . 
2 1. Significa ntly. the to uchstone discuss io n of ve nture capi ta l contrac ting. Sahlman, 
supra note 7. a t 506. makes no assertion respecting th e freque ncy of VC control. It d oes note 
the incidence of sha re d con tro l in the board room. 
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Kaplan and Stromberg find that one or the other party, VC or E, 
has control of the board in on ly 38% of their cases. In this subset, the 
VC takes control in two-thirds of the cases and the E takes control in 
one-third of th e cases. Also, cases of VC contro l are more likely to 
occur in late stage financings. In the remaining 62% of the cases, 
neither side takes control."~ Instead, the VC and the E each designate 
a direc tor for a seat or seats. They then agree on a candidate to fill the 
remaining seat or seats. Under standard corporate law on allocation of 
authority, control of the boardroom means contro l of the assets and 
personnel."' T he upshot on the downside, ass uming confl icting vit:ws in 
E and VC as to the best course of action , or, indeed, ass uming that VC 
·wishes to remove E from the position of chief executive officer 
("CEO"), is that the views and votes of the third di rec tor are outcome 
de terminative. 
Ka plan and Stromberg also collect data on vot ing control a t the 
shareholder level. A t this point recall that while a majori ty of the 
voting shares means boardroom control with plain vanilla corporate 
documentation, standard corporate practice permits shareholders to 
make special contractual arrangements respecting boardroom control. 
Such is the case with venture capital transactions, which tend to 
provide separate voting schemes for board election, on the one hand, 
and for other matters on which shareholders vote, on the other hand. 
The latter proceed on a one vote-per-share basis .2.j Accordingly, voting 
control over matters like charter amendments and mergers goes to the 
actor, E or VC, holding the largest number of shares. The number of 
and proportion of shares held by E and VC in turn will vary depending 
on how well E performs. It is customary in venture capital contracting 
to use stock ownership as a performance incentive for E, setting out 
performance targets and providing that more stock vests in E as the 
targets are met. Ka plan and Stromberg report that in 70.8% of cases, 
the VC controls a majority of the votes, assuming no performance-
based stock allocations to the E ever come to vest. G iven full vesting, 
the number of cases in which VC controls a maj ority decreases to 
55.8% . E controls in 11.6% of the cases, rising to 23.1% given full 
vesting. Neither party controls in 17.6%, rising to 21.1% given full 
vesting. Some variance comes into the figures in subsets broken down 
by round of investment. VC control is higher (86.8% , no vest ing; 
65.8% full vesting) in rounds conducted where the startup has not ye t 
produced revenues and lower in post revenue rounds (59.0 % no 
vesting; 48.7% full vesting). The net on the downside , where full 
22. Kaplan & Stromberg. supra note 12 (work ing pa per at 17). 
23. See. e.g, D EL. CODE ANN. ti t. 8, § 14l(a) (2001). 
24. Or, in the case of the VC a vote equal to the number of sh ares of common stock into 
which its shares are convertible . 
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vesting of E performance-based stock IS unlikely to have occurred, 
strongly favors VC voting control. 
I 
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS- THE CONTROL RANGE 
KAPLAN & STROMBERG'S RESULTS 
Traditional Shared Voting 
Contracts- Control Control in 
E Voting vc 
Control 
Power to Control Assets I 13% 62% 25'Jo 
Control of Board of 
Directors 
Exposure to Contract 
Opportunism 
Majority of Voting Shares 
No Vesting 11.6% 
I 
17.6% 70.8% 
Full Vesting 23.1% 21.1% 55.8% 
Kaplan and Stromberg show strong correlations between share 
voting control and board control. Where VC has voting control, VC 
also has board control in 22.5% of the cases, but board control is 
shared in 70% of the cases where VC has voting control. Where VC 
never has voting control, board control is shared in 58.1% of the cases; 
E controls in 38.7% of the cases. Where VC has voting control subject 
to divestment given E equity vesting, board control is shared in 94.1% 
of the cases. A correlation between voting rights and cash flow rights 
also can be noted. The VC mean economic ownership claim in all 
transactions assuming no vesting is 55.7% and47.6% with full vesting. 
Finally, Kaplan and Stromberg report that in 15% of the cases, the 
documentation defines a state of unacceptable suboptimal 
performance in advance by reference to financial information and 
provides for a state-contingent transfer of control to the venture 
capitalist. 25 
Summing up, shared control in the boardroom is the dominant 
governance mode in the portfolio companies in Kaplan and 
25. Kaplan & Stromberg. supra note 12 (working paper at 59 tbl. 6. 60 tbl. 7). 
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Stromberg 's sample. It even prevails in a majority of the cases where 
one or the othe r of VC orE has a majorit y o f voting shares. But , a t the 
same time , VC and E each have boardroom cont ro l in significant 
numbers of portfolio companies. This data complicates the 
explanatory task for theory of the firm. The questio n is ne ithe r why 
VC control. nor why E control. It is , first, why shared control in most 
cases with outli e r cases of VC control and E contro l? Second, how, if 
at a ll , do the shared control arrangements described in Kaplan and 
StrC"imhc:rg·s sample function so as to assure full rea li zation of a given 
startup·s profit potential? 
B. Incomplete Contracts Th eo ries of the Firnz 
T his A rti cle's principal asse rtion is th at the value of shared co ntrol 
lies in the fact tha t it makes E's day- to-day control of asse ts and 
manage ment co ntes table, facilitating control transfer a t low cost eve n 
as it gives E a degree of assurance against arbitrary and capricious 
exercise of that control transfer power. To see why these factors are 
important, look at the situation ex ante, before VC commits its money. 
VC knows tha t E could have a valuable business idea even while 
simultaneously turning out to be a poor manager. E knows tha t VCs 
bring this skeptical point of view to their review of portfolio 
companies , but E also knows that VCs are not immune to adverse 
selection and may not be infallible in their business judgments. Both 
parties also know that as events unfold , E and VC may interpre t them 
differently, with E as the inside party having an advantage respecting 
hard information. There results a nascent conflict of interest, which 
may or may not ripen depending on future events. A shared control 
arrangement holds out advantages as a solution. It gives VC a 
governance structure that contemplates ex ante that a profess ional 
manager may have to replace £.At the same time , shared control lets 
E take charge of the business without being VC's a t-will employee, as 
would be the case if VC had control of the board. The shared-control 
arrangement leaves the matter of E 's performance eva luation open 
and waits for events to unfold. 
VC will want to take control of the assets and replace E on a 
moderate downside scenario26 - the portfolio company still has 
prospects but E does not appear to be equipped to rea lize them. Such 
mediocre or poor performance can stem from adverse selection or 
moral hazard problems. In e ither case , it would not give rise to conflict 
of interest and contracting problems between E and VC in a world 
26. A ca ta st roph ic downside sce na rio arises whe n the portfolio co mpa ny·s business has 
no prospects unde r anyone "s manageme nt. H e re VC contracts in the e nd prov ide for 
te rmina tion with th e VC taking the crumbs off the tabl e. See infra text accompanying no te 
149. 
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where E derives no private benefits from the control of assets. Oliver 
Hart shows that in such an ideal (and taxless) world, first-best results 
easi ly can be achieved with an ali-common-stock capital structure and 
a simple incentive compensation system. Hart describes a simple two-
period situation where the firm is founded at t = 0 and liquidated at t = 
2, with an intermediate decision respecting liquidation or continuance 
to be made at t = 1, along with a dividend payment. Hart would make 
the compensation of the managing participant E depend entirely on 
the dividend d. That i:s. incentive compensation 1 should equal "P(dl + 
d2)," where P is a proportion of the firm 's total returns. If the 
payment also covers a proportion of liquidation proceeds L - I = 
P[dl + (d2, L)j - E can be expected to make an optimal decision 
respecting liquidation at t = 1. If the expected value of liquidation 
returns at t = 1 is greate r than the to tal returns expected at t = 2, the 
firm is liquidated at t = 1 and no cost ly contracting designed to align 
the manager's incentives with those of outside investors is necessary. 27 
Under this incentive structure there is no ex ante prospect of firm 
continuance in the event of poor results. 
The real world problem is that managers like E do derive private 
benefits from asset management. In Hart's conception, the bribe 
required to align their incentives with those of the outside security 
holders is unfeasibly large. 28 Accordingly, a complex capital structure 
must be devised in order to align incentives in the direction of optimal 
investment and management and to ensure that the actor with the 
appropriate incentives controls the assets. 
Incomplete contracts models of capital structure seek to describe 
such incentive-compatible capital structures. They start with a 
common sense definition of contracts: contracts are comprised of 
advance specifications of future results. To the extent that a given 
outcome cannot successfully be specified in advance, the subject 
matter is noncontractible. The models make three assertions about 
corporate contracts and capital structures. First, corporate contracts 
can be expected to omit important future variables because of the 
difficulty or impossibility of ex ante description. That is, the particular 
posture of events on which crit ical governance outcomes will later 
depend may not be sufficiently specifiable in advance so as to permit 
the parties to draft in advance a contract term setting out appropriate 
instructions. Second , corporate contracts can be expected to omit 
27. OLIVER HART, FIRMS. CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 146-48 (1995); 
see aiso Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer. Robusr Financial Conlracling und rhe Role of 
Venlure Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994) (setting forth the fixed fraction model of venture 
capitalist participation). 
28, See HART, supra note 27, at 146-48. The treatment of Hellmann, supra note 13. 
should be contrasted at this point. In that set up, E's private benefits from control may be 
outweighed by the upside prospects of a payoff on E's common stock in the firm, which 
payoff will be realized only if E gives up controL 
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importan t future variables due to the difficulty or impossibility of ex 
post observation and verification.29 That is, even if the parti es can 
anticipate and describe future contingencies, once events have 
unfolded in the future , no concrete factu al basis may exist for the 
operation of an advance legislative directive. To enforce a contractual 
specification, you must be able to make a proof in court. Complex 
facts of business life do not always lend themselves to such 
presentations, especially by those outside the firm, whether 
uovernment regulators or VCs. Meanwhile, hard accounting numbers 
0 ~ ~ 
produced by a firm do not by themselves direct business judgments 
and are in any event subject to manipulation by ins iders. A nd 
noncontractibility may obtain because the requ isite transactional 
technologies do not yet exist. 30 Third, given the forego ing problems of 
noncontractibility, important outcomes in corporate contracts will be 
de termined not by advance specification but by the firm's structure of 
ownership. The specification of the owner and any associated 
contingent control allocations built into the firm's contracts - in 
particular the contracts making up the capital structure - substitute 
for contract terms absent clue to the condition of contractual 
incompleteness.31 
As the zone of noncontractible contingencies expands, the 
ownership specifications become more important. Ownership and 
control of the assets will not be vested in perpetuity in a single actor, 
because doing so would both imply a low-powered performance 
incentive and leave the firm without defense against adverse selection 
and opportunism. In this conceptualization, the firm's present owners 
are the actors who direct its ongoing management and investment 
policies, or, in the alternative, who determine whether to sell or 
29. For contributions to the lite rature making this point, see Sanford J. G rossman & 
Oliver D . Hart, Th e Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertiwl and Larem/ 
lmegmrion. 941. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Olive r Hart & John Moore. lncunzp/ere Comruc1s 
and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988) [here inafte r H art & Moore. ln culllpiele 
ConiraC!s]; Bengt Holmstrom & PaullVIilgrom, Multi/ask Principui-Agenr l lnulyses: lncen rive 
Contracts, Asser Ownership, and Job Design. 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991) (specia l issue) 
(showing that contracts that tie an agent's compensation to verifiabl e measures can divert 
effort and attention from other more important but less easil y meas ured aspects of 
performance). 
30. Unlike most law and economics, which te nds to include any voluntary economic 
re lat ion within its no tion of the ex ante contract , incomple te contrac ts theory restricts the 
reach of the ex ante contract to cases where actors make explicit specifications about the 
future. That is, to have "contrac t" ' te rms that govern future states. those contingent sta tes 
must be specified and the future outcomes must be computable. Since many future sta tes of 
nature clea rly are not computable , transacting parties as a result lack the technology 
ne cessary to e nable the negotiation and composition of a contract te rm ex ante. See Luca 
Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Incomplete Written Conrracls: Undescriboble Sliltes of Nat ure. 
109 Q.J. EcoN. 1085 (1994). 
31. See Aghion & Bo lton. supra note 13, at 479. 
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liquidate the firm. '" In the event of suboptimal performance, control 
transfer to an actor possessing more compatible incentives may be 
advisa ble. T he firm' s perfo rmance thus depends on the incentives not 
on ly of its present owners but of its contingent future owners. Optimal 
capital structure depe nds on the co ntrol transfer arrangements tha t 
shape these incentives. 3' 
Significa ntly, incomplete contracts economics makes no reso rt to 
" implicit co ntrac ts" as it describes govern ance structures. The term 
implicit co ntracts , as used in law and eco nomics , d escribes 
co un terparty conduct th at a given contract party expects (often in a 
situation o f trust or re liance) , but as to which no explicit req uireme nt 
exists in th e con tract. Such expecta tions often ar ise respec ting future 
events as to which con tractual specifica tion satisfying all parties is 
d ifficult or impossible. Implicit contracts fill these gaps. But they do 
no t do so as implied , legally enforceable duties, as do the imp lied 
contracts of contract law. In the law and economics usage, no lega l 
constraints follow from the identification of an implicit contract. More 
often than not , the dependent party is left exposed to counterparty 
opportunism and remitted to self-prot ection through explicit 
contracting the next time around. In giving this instruction, the 
implicit contracts approach m akes a significant assumption- that the 
zone of contractibility is universal and that incomplete contracts 
a lways can be completed. Given tha t assumption , it appears to make 
good policy sense to deploy the law so as to force the parti es to 
conclude their own contracts rather than insert contract terms devised 
by judges acting ex post.34 
Incomple te contracts economics holds out a distinctly di ffe ren t 
approach to cont racts because it does not assume universa l 
32. Notably. ·· owne r· · is here specially defined as the party who ha s the rig ht to co ntro l 
a ll aspects of the asse t tha t have not been give n ove r to contrac tual specifica tio n ex ante. 
G rossman & Hart. supra note 29, at 695. U nder th is de finit ion. owne rshi p an d control 
ca nnot be sepa rated. a lthough they can be sha red. Since asse t control is owne rship. residual 
cla imants who do no t manage are not owners. whatever the law's -::ontemplati on . 
33. It should be not ed that the basic asse rtions of the incomple te con trac ts school are a 
subject of debate in economic theory. See Eric Maskin & Jean Tiro le, Unforeseen 
Conringencies an d lncomple!e Comraus, 66 REV. ECON. STU D. 83 (1 999), fo r an arg ument 
tha t pa rties can indeed design con tra cts tha t overcome the proble ms the school describes as 
" noncontractibl e." and that irre levance obtains as between an incomple te contract le ft ope n 
to ex post renegoti a tion and a contract with described trades. The response appears in 
O live r Hart & John Moore, Foundacions of Incomplele Conrracls, 66 R EV. E CON . STUD. 115 
(1999) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Foundations] . 
34. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fische l. Conlracl and Fiduciary Dury, 36 J .L. 
& ECON. 425. 445 (1993) (asserting a presumption in fa vor of forcing parties to ge t their own 
contracts). At the sa me tim e, gaps ca n be fi lled in when the decisionmaker knows what the 
actors wou ld have agreed on in a cos tless contracting environment. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. 
Gord on. Th e !vfan dato ry Srrucl!lre of Corporate Law, 89 COL UM . L. REV. 1549, 1550-52 
(1989). To the au thor's knowledge, the la tter principle has never been brought to bear to 
prote ct a senior securityholder. 
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contractibility. Indeed, it holds tha t transacting actors can create 
producing institutions that assuredly evolve toward the first-best only 
to the extent that they dea l with con tractible subject matter. Absent 
contractibility, we necessarily a rc in a second -best world , where the 
function of economics is to iden tify and explain barriers that prevent 
the evolution of first-best transactio n structures. In this second-best 
world, no all-pervasive presumption against regulation arises. Where 
subject matter is noncontractibl e. problems have to be sorted out ex 
post. and it makes no sense to remit parties to ex ante contract. lt does 
not necessarily foll ow that a give n judicial or other regula tory 
interven tion will move actors in a productive direction. In theo ry , 
given ideal circumstances. incomplete ness only mea ns that the pa rties 
themse lves renegotiate ex post once the requisite facts are on the 
table. ~'i In the real world. howeve r, such ren egotiat ions do not 
necessarily occur under ideal conditions. D e te rminations about the 
desirability of judicia l intervent ion to protect against opportunism 
accordingly have to be made case by case. 
C. The Contingent Control Model 
There follows a contingent control transfer model ("CTM") 
abstracted from precedent work by Aghion and Bolton so as to appear 
in an accessible form keyed to the description of real world venture 
capital arrangements.36 The CTM is well suited to the exposition of the 
control transfer problem in venture capital contexts.37 This section 
recounts its main properties. The section that follows discusses its 
implications for real world venture capital contracting. 
1. The Setup 
Once again we ge t a two-period model built on a stylized picture of 
the relationship between E and VC. The two-period framework 
follows the life of a firm from birth to liquida tion, facilitating a 
dynamic inquiry into the incentive effects of different capital 
structures. An amount K is invested in the firm at t = 0; all of K comes 
from VC. The firm is liquidated at t = 2, when mone tary returns rare 
35. The dispute bet ween Mask in & T irole and H ar t & Moore. see supra no te 33, in part 
turns on whether the parties credibly can commit no t to renegoti a te. If they can, then the 
case for investing resources in adva nce specifica ti on stre ngthens. See Hart & Moore, 
Foundations, supra note 33. a t 128. 
36. See Aghion & Bolton. supra note 13. at 479. The mode l is applied in the context of a 
discussion of dividend policy in William W. B ratton, Dividends, Noncontmctibility, and 
Corporare La w. 19 CA RDOZO L. RE V. 409. 429-34 (1997). For contrasting theoretical 
pictures of control transfe r in senior-junior securi ty holder contexts, see G. Mitu Gulati et 
a!.. Conn ected Contmcts. 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 908-18 (1999): D. G ordon Smith, Team 
Production in Venrure Capita/Investing. 24 J. COR P. L. 949 (1999). 
37. See Kaplan & Stromberg. supm note 12. 
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realized . T he amount of the payout will depend on an action a to be 
taken from among the set of feasible act ions A by the actor in con trol 
of the firm aft er the realization of a sta te of nature 8 at t = 1. T here are 
only two possible future states of nature, a good business state e~ and a 
bad business sta te 8". D ifferen t actions a will be optimal depending on 
which sta te occurs. More particulatl y, action set A con ta ins o nly two 
possible actions, o, and a, , in each of the two states o f nature 8~ and 8". 
In state 8, the maximizing choice of action o'' is a,. and in state e" the 
first -best choice of action a* is o1, . Just which 8 is going to occur is not 
clear at i = 0, vvhen E and VC ente r into a contract wh ich m ust address 
the contingency of respecting the future choice of n. At t = 1, 
immediately prior to the time for the choice oi u, t he operat ion of the 
business will produce a signals as to the ~; ta t:.; of nature 8, or 8/·~ 
II 
CONTINGENT CONTROL M ODEL - T IME SEQUENCE 
Investment 
t = 0 
Signals 
as toe 
Action a taken 
Rea liza tion o f K 
returns r 
t = 2 
The model works the classic conflict-of-inte rest problem between 
E and VC through this framework. T he inte rests come into conflict 
because re turns to E and VC are received in different forms such tha t 
choices of different actions a can impact them differentially:'') 
Monetary returns of the project r are payable to VC at t = 2, minus 
amounts of compensation payable to E pursuant to a compensation 
schedule in the contract concluded at t = 0 by E and VC. T he 
compensation arrangement provides a transfer t ;:: 0, the precise 
amount of which is a function of s and r. T hus VC's payout y = r - t. 
38. Aghion & Bolton . supra note 13. a t 475-n. The mode l a lso ass umes th at E has no 
wealth and needs to fi nan ce the e ntire sta rtup cost K for he r proj ect. A number of ad diti ona l 
assumpti ons are made . There are on ly two possible outcomes for s. ()o r 1. wi th s = 1 meaning 
that it is more proba ble than not th a t 8 = 8,. and s = 0 mea ning that it is more probable than 
no t that () = 11,,. In o rder to make the initial investment of K plausible . the p robability q of)', 
+ (! - q)y,, > K. In add iti on. there a re only two possibl e re turns rat r = 2. e ither 0 o r 1. and 
the initia l contrac t between E a nd VC m ay be renegotiated a fter the rea liza tion of 8, with a ll 
the barga ining power lying with E. /d. at 477-79. 
39. The mode l assumes that both E a nd VC are risk ne utral as to income. /d. a t 476. 
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Critically, E also receives significan t, nonmonetary private benefits b, 
such as reputation, \vhich are not also received by VC. The quantum 
of b is a legitima te part of the overal l yie ld o f va lue from the project , 
but is neither observable nor ve rifi able by third parties. Yie lds of both 
r and b will depend on the state of nature e and the choice of a. E's 
yield is a function of r(a ,e) + b(a,e), and VC's yie ld is so lely a function 
of r(o ,e) . The conflict of interest devolves on the choice o f a because 
the choice of a can diffe rentiall y impact r and b, and open up a 
significant differential of returns be tween VC and £.~11 
E and VC confront significant problems of noncontractibility a t t = 
0. It would be easy if the state of nature 8 could be specified ex ante. 
Then it might be possible fo r the contract between E and VC to direct 
the party in control , presumably E, to ta ke a jointly maximizing action 
u ' · Unfortun ate ly e is impossible or very costly to descri be ex ante, 
although the parties will be able to identify e ex post, at t = 2. The 
model does, however, ass ume th a t eve n though the £- VC contract 
cannot be made directly contingent on e, it can be made contingent on 
the signals, which is verifiable although imperfectly corre lated with e. 
Even so, the occurrence of s at r = 1 does no t enable the drafting of a 
complete contract. Even if s perfectly correlated with e, the project 
still would be too complex to permit an ex ante specification of the 
optimizing response a~ or a,, upon the realization of s. Although the set 
of choices will be limited to a" and n,, the model makes the realistic 
assumption that both will lie wholly within the realm of traditional 
management business judgment to be exercised by the actor in control 
of the firm. Neither is susceptible to direct specification or to indirect 
specification through a constellation of affirmative and negative 
covenan ts.4 1 
The upshot is tha t the capital structure 's allocation of control rights 
between E and VC will determine the choice of a and the level of 
value , optimal or suboptimal, yielded by the firm.~2 The capital 
structure, as set out in the £- VC contract , inevitably specifies an 
allocation of control which in turn determines which actor has the 
privilege to chose action a. Control can lie in E or in V C or in both. 
40. Aghion & Bo lton, supra no te 13 . at 476 . G iven the specifica tion of firs t bes t action a, 
and a,, the expected re turns y a nd priva te be ne fit s b realized by VC and E in B, and B/> will 
have the foll owing properties: · 
yFJp., + b(-lp., > yOp,, + b(-IJ'" 
yO,,a" + bO,,a/> > yB,,a, + bB,,a, 
41. Direct specification mi ght be possible in a d iffe re nt case. whe re a, a nd a,. e ntail a 
selection be twe en a limite d se t of choice s identifia ble in advance - for · example , eith e r 
me rger, liquidat ion. or sa le o f a ssets. But eve n give n the feasibility o f tha t sort or 
specifica tion, ex post judicial e nforce me nt of the con trac tual directive could still fa ll short o f 
fe as ibility if info rmatio n asymmetries le d to problems of third-party ver ification . Aghion & 
Bo lton, supra note 13. at 477-78. 
42. !d. at 476-77. 
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T he CTM works through the scenarios of E contro l. VC co ntro L and 
joint control to asce rtain the di s tance betwee n th e se t of results built 
in by the ince ntive structure and first-best set of result s. W h ere E 
con trols. a fir st-bes t choice of act ion follows a utomat ically onl y whe n 
the choice of a''' also happens to m axi mize y, b. and the transfe r 
payment r. H e re E s incentives are pe rfectl y align ed with th e ge nera l 
~ <~ximizing res ult. 4 ~ But. given the way the CTM is set up. on som e 
outcomes th e incentives are misa ligned - whe n E contro ls. its private 
benefits ca use it to make the wro ng cho ice o n a bad outcome . VC s 
cho ice o f act ion is subopt im al on a good outcome. 
The CT M runs tvvo modes of work ing around th e misa ligned 
in ce nti ves . The first is Coasian bargaining. m odeled on th e assumptio n 
tha t th e e ntre preneur has all the bargaining powe r.'J The seco nd is 
control transfe r spec ified in advance in the E- VC contrac t and 
triggered by th e signa ls. 
2. Coasian Bargaining 
It is a trui sm of law and economi cs tha t even given misa ligned 
incentives, an optimal result, here a*, can result from a ro und of 
Coasian bargaining ex post. Given subject matter presenting 
contractibility problems, Coasian bargaining is a p articula rly attractive 
alternative because it lets the parties leave the m atter open ex ante, 
saving on transaction costs and avoiding use of dysfunctional 
provisions. In the CTM, a round of negotiation would occur after the 
rea lization of s at r = 1 in which a noncontro lling party benefitted by 
the choice of a* purchases its choice by the controlling party with a 
side payment.45 Ass uming 8", we speak of a case where a * = a", but the 
private benefit return b to E yielded by a choice of a suboptimal 
choice of a~ is greate r tha n value of b yielded by the choice of a*. In 
addition, the yield of y to VC is greater if a* is chosen over a/ 6 For 
simplicity , th e model assumes that E has a ll the barga ining power. 
Give n the above a li gnment of values, E will o ffer to choose a * (here 
8,,a") if VC pays E the sum equal to th e diffe rence between th e value 
of y yie lded on th e choice of a* and the value of y yie lde d on a 
suboptima l choice of a.47 VC can be expected to accept th e offer 
provided that the amount offered is grea ter than its original 
43. !d. a t 480-8 I. 
44 . The mode l ass um es that the world is full of venture capitalists but contains only a 
few entre preneurs with good projects. E as a resu lt has all the barga ining powe r: E ca n make 
a take -it-o r-leave-it offer which VC wi ll accept so lo ng as the dea l ho lds o ut an expected 
re turn of a t leas t K. !d. at 480-i\2. 
45. See H ART. supra no te 27. a t 98 (d iscussing the Aghion-Bolton mode l) . 
46. Tha t is. b((),,a) + 1 > b(O,.a,) + t. and y(B,.a,,) > y(B,.aj 
47. Tha t is. y(B,.a,,) - y(O,p). prov ided tha t b(B,.a,.) + 1 + y(B,,a,.)- y(Op);::: b(B,.a) + 1. 
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investment K.~x Assuming 8", then a''' = o", and a ro und of bargaining 
results if the private benefit return b to E yielded by a suboptimal 
choice of a~> is gre Z~ter than the yie ld of b o n Zl cho ice of a* and the 
yield of y to VC is greZ~ter where a* is chosen over ai> .4Y Since E has all 
th e bargaining power. E will offer to choose ((' (here 8JtJ if VC pays 
E the difference between the va lue of y yielded on the ·choice of a''' 
and the value of y yie lded on a suboptima l choice of a. 50 Once again, 
VC can be expected to accept the offer provided th a t the amount 
offe red is greate r than its origina l investment K. Stated d iffe rently, on 
a bad state wit h E in co ntro l, if the in crease in re turns to VC that 
results from substi tut ing an optimal cho ice of action is gre ater than the 
di ffe ren ti al in returns to E that results from aba ndo ning the 
suboptimal act ion. then VC, given the signal of a bad outcome, vvi1l 
bribe E with a payment that at least makes up E s differen tia l so long 
as the returns to VC net of the payments pay back at leas t its original 
investment and make it better off than it wou ld be wi th the suboptimal 
choice. 
The problem is that, given the CTM's se t up, Coas ian bargaining 
does not always lead to an efficient result. This insufficiency stems 
from the fact that renegotiation lead ing to a* does not result in every 
case. The model assumes , realistically enough, tha t the re turn of a t 
least K constitutes a rationality constraint for VC. Thus, the 
renegotiation fa ils and the first-bes t result will not be chosen if the 
value of K is so high that it exceeds the yield on offer by E. Th e very 
possibility that this situation co uld arise has destabilizing implications 
for the whole deal : VC can be expected to refuse to inves t at t = 0 
unless some form of pro tection against E's opportunism is included in 
the contract package .' 1 
In general, Coasian bargaining fails to assure optimal results in 
midstream corporate contexts where the interests of the party 
48. That is. y(R,a) 2 K. 
49. T hat is. wh ere h(Op) + 1 > /;((}p) + I, and v (Op) > v(O,o,). 
50. Tha t is, y(O,u)- }'(0/11). provided that b({lJl) + 1 + y(O,a)- y(&p,.) 2 bi&p,) + 1. 
51. See Aghion & Bolto n. supra note 13. at 480-83. The CTM runs th e VC co ntrol 
scenario with simil a rly eq uivocal results. Here fir st-best choi ces of action will foll ow on ly 
where the choice of a that maxi mizes y happens to be a*. meaning that VCs incentives are 
perfectly aligned with the genera l maximizing res ult. Whe re the choice of a th at ma ximizes y 
is not first-best there can be room for Pareto-improvi ng renegotiati on in the form of a bribe 
paid to the actor in contro l by the actor d isadva ntage d by th e suboptimal choice of a. But 
once again, it turns out that the opt imal choice a* does not resu lt in every case. The model's 
re asonable assumption of a wealth co nstraint on E 's pa rt ( VC provides all of K) substanti a ll y 
limi ts the possibility of re negotiation where V C controls. Simply put. since h and 1 constitute 
E's entire wealth. E lacks the resources to mak e the bribe . For VC contro l to assure first-be st 
results, then , the amount o f 1 has to be set high enough to give E sufficient cash fo r th e bribe . 
But this adjustment, in turn. returns us to the same piace as the searc h for the firs t-bes t 
under E co~tr ol. As 1 increases. projected in vestmen t returns to VC fall short of [( at some 
point and VC refuses to invest. !d. at 483-84. 
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controlling the assets (usually E or management) in the conduct of the 
business differ from those of contributors of capital (usually VC or 
outside equity). This generalization is intuitively attractive, and it 
obtains even in the absence of bargaining costs . endowment effects, or 
collective action problems, the latter being the factor usua lly cited 
against midstream renegotiation of corporate contracts.52 The key to 
the result is the CTM's ascription of bargaining power to E. 'vVith that 
power. E can negotiate VC down to an ex post return y that is less 
than VCs original investment K That res ult kills the deal ex ante. In 
the rea l world , in the absence of fiduci a ry const raints. protective 
contrac t terms, or an immediately exercisable contingent control 
power to terminate E, E will have significant bargaining power a long 
the iincs assumed in the CTM. The power ar ises in the first instance 
from the information asymmetries fav oring E. Cost:-; and other 
fricti o ns in the way of E 's removal enhan ce that bargaining power. As 
the pO\vcr grows, VCs investment returns shrink. 
[t follows, logically enough, that VC (or any other outside equity 
inves tor) needs one of three things - fiduciary protection, protective 
contract terms , or an immediately exercisable contingent control 
power. The CTM proceeds to the third of these alternatives . 
3. Control Transfer by Advance Specification 
The CTM employs the device of contingent control to solve the 
problem presented by the misalignment of the incentives of E and VC 
so as to yield results superior to that of Coasian renegotiation. T wo 
additional assumptions have to be made to support the contingent 
control device's operation - that VC's re turns are higher when a 
suboptimal choice of a is made in 8~ states , and that E's returns are 
higher when a suboptimal choice of a is made in 81> sta tes.53 With this 
alignment, VC will make a first-best choice in 8" and E will make a 
first-b es t choice in 8~, and a contract that accords control to VC in 81> 
and E in 8, will be optimal. These assumptions reflect an appea ling 
intuition about the governance of startups. E knows the business and 
should not be disturbed on 8~ scenarios. But since E also derives 
private benefits from control of the business, E is ill suited to make an 
optimal choice of business plan, or an optimal decision between 
termination and continuance, in eh states. 
Since 8 is unverifiable, the feasibility of a contingent control 
arrangement depends on the degree of correlation between s and 8.54 
Given the requisite correlation, an optimal arrangement can be made 
52. See. e.g .. John C. Coffee. Jr. . The Manduiorv Fnabling /Jalan ce in Corpora/e LaiV: 
An Essay on1he .lwlicial Role. 8Y COLUiVI. L. REV. 1618. 1664-65 ( l989). 
53. T hat is, that y0/1, < yB,a, and that bO"a" < bO,,a,. 
5-I. Aghion & Bolton. supra note l3 , at 484-86. 
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operational with relati ve ease in a world with a fric tionless bankruptcy 
process. Thus does the CT M use a contract provision to avert 
difficult ies stemming fro m the noncontractib le nature of e. More 
particularly, VC's participation in the firm ta kes the form of debt. T he 
realiza tion of sat r = 1 is made a de faul t/no-default event, with defaul t 
occurring in a eli state. 51 ln the event of defaul t, E becomes bankrupt 
and VC takes co ntrol , choosing the fi rst -best a; in 8~ sta tes there is no 
default and E stays in charge .56 T he same resul t can be effected with 
preferred stock (in a fr ict ionless world ). T he rea lization of s signaling 
an eh state trigge rs a rede mption of VC s stock. H E does not have a 
source of substi tute capita l, the du ty to redeem ca uses bankrup tcy and 
the same result as deb t finance .57 
4. lmplicmions 
The CTM has a number of int uitive ly attrac ti ve implications. The 
assertion that hard-wired contingent control transfers dominate over 
backroom renegotiations resona tes we ll. The model also raises a 
pertinent question respecting the relative effectiveness of employment 
contracts and control transfer structures as means of channelling E's 
incentives in productive directions. The model implies that where 
crucial management choices - selections of a from se ts A - are 
noncontractible due to problems of observability and verifiability and 
where E enjoys private benefits, monetary incentive schemes based on 
firm profitability or stock market performance cannot be expected to 
import adequate discipline. Control structures allowing outsider 
investors to take act ions that managers dislike in the event of poor 
firm performance, although a second-bes t solution, can be expected to 
do a more effective job of manipula ting management incentives in 
productive directions.53 
But the CTM's exclusive reli ance on bankruptcy control transfer 
makes its transition to real worl d practice problematic. Bankruptcy, 
after all , is a dras tic and costly step to have to take. T he next section 
works pas t this sticking point. 
55. The precedent mode l is in Jai me F . Zende r. Oprin w l Finan cial lnsrrum enrs, 46 J. 
F IN. 1645 (1991). 
56. Aghi o n & Bol to n. supm no te 13. a t 487 . 
57. Provided the re is no t a significant amount of debt. which by definition is se ni or to 
VC's preferred stock, in the capita l s tructure. 
58. Ma thias D ewa tripont & Jea n T iro le. A Theo ry of D ehr and Equit1·: Diversi fy of 
Securiries and Man ager-Shareho lder Congru ence. 109 Q .J. E CON. 1027 -28 (1994). 
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D. Th e CTM and the Role ofSenior Securities in Venture Capiro! 
Contracring 
This section moves the CTM a step in the direction of th e real 
wo rld practice described in Section A by relaxing so me assumptions 
and expanding the menu of contractua l dev ices implicating contro l 
and control transfer. 
A t first inspect ion, the data set out in Section A appear to suggest 
that the CTM's analytical structure lacks predict ive power in the 
ven ture capi tal context. Reca ll th a t the mos t like ly rea l wo rld 
arrangement is shared cont ro l. and the next most li ke ly is ves tin g of 
contro l in one party or the othe r. Contingent control transfer devices 
hased on advance specificat ion of an s show up in a minority of the 
cases . But the data none the less instant iate the CTM's dynam ic in 
significant ways. For one thing . the real wor ld ve nture capital 
contracts· boardroom-control arrangements have to be read toge ther 
with their financia l prOVISIOns. These invariably provid e for 
redemption of the preferred held by VC in the intermediate term. This 
means that in an extreme e, state the contracts provide for a 
bankruptcy transfer of control, exactly as predicted by the CTM. On 
the other hand , the CTM has less immediate relevance with respect to 
control transfer in e, states where turn around remains a possibility 
and e~ states where retention of E will be profitable but suboptimal. 
But the framework can be adopted to assist our understanding of 
these situations. 
T he CTM 's limitations stem from two components. First, it effects 
its contingent control transfer through a bankruptcy proceeding on the 
assumption that bankruptcy is frictionless. In the rea l world , 
bankruptcy costs are onerous.w Venture capital practice shows us that 
these costs do not have to be incurred to e ffe ct a contingent control 
transfer. Second, the mode l limits itse lf to a contract term as it 
a ttempts to dea l with the problem of noncontractibility. In so doing it 
hypothesizes an imperfect but pl a usible element of contractible 
subj ect matter: A lthough e is un verifi able, the trigger s is ve ri fiable 
even though it is not a perfect proxy for e. But what of cases whe re no 
reli able s exists, or where the parties cannot agree on one? In these 
cases some other control transfer device must be employed. The 
discussion that follows expands the menu of possibilities to include 
processes implicating control transfer and operating on an open-ended 
basis, dispensing with contrac tual triggers. 
5LJ . See. e.g .. Edwa rd I. Altm a n. A Furrher Empirical ln vcsriga rion of rh e Bankmprcy 
Cost Question. 39 J. F IN. 1067 (ILJ84) (estimating tota l bankruptcy costs to be 20% of the 
va lue of the firm) . 
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1. Bankruprcv Versus Boardroom Control Tmmfer 
The CTM's assumption that control transfe r occurs on a 
bankruptcy scenario can be relaxed easily by refe re nce to standa rd 
tools of corporate law practice . In a close corpo ration contex t, changes 
of control in the boardroom ca n be contracted for in advance, even if 
the V C takes preferred stock. E and VC sim ply ente r into a ··pooling 
agreement ," contracting in the ir capacity as sha reholde rs with respect 
to thei r future votes. In the context of the CTM. they wo uld execute a 
voting agreement pu rs uant to which the occurre nce o f s sign aling an 8" 
state vvo ulcl trigger th e ex te nsion of a continge nt irrevoca ble proxy 
from E to VC. The proxy would gi ve VC the votes to e lect a majority 
of th e board and to remove incumbent directors. W ith boardroom 
contro L VC ca n choose the CE O who will choose cr"'8,/11 
60. See D ewat ripont & Tirol e . supra note 5:S. A lth ough s till a mod e l den omi nate d as a 
deb t-equity mode l, it no ne the less cap tures the dyna mi c of a boa rdroo m contro l tra nsfe r. 
This is a nother two-pe ri o d contingent contro l m od <e l. U nli ke th<e Agh ion- Bolto n model. this 
one includes outs ide debt a nd outside e quity in teres ts. H e re . a t 1 = 0. ou tside fin a ncing and 
ince ntive compe nsation arra ngements a re wo rke d o ut and manage me nt chooses an effo rt 
level e. The leve l of e will be e ither hi gh o r low. wi th high e producing higher returns in late r 
pe riods but res ulting in the incurre nce o f a utility cos t U to the manage rs. At 1 = l the fim1 
reports its first pe riod profit. npl, a ve rifiable am o unt th a t is determin e d by e. bu t which is 
not a sufficient sta ti stic for e. In additi o n. a signa l s is realize d at this point. The dis tributio n 
o f signa l s also is de te rmine d by e, and s is a suffic ie nt s ta ti s tic tor th e profit to be rea lized at 1 
= 2, np2. But s is noncontrac tible a nd manage me nt compe nsation according ly ca nnot be 
made directly con tingent on it. 
Thi s mode l's distingui shing ass umption is that the firm's capital structure accords 
clecisio nmaking powe r to e ithe r the o uts ide debtho lde r o r the outs ide equi tyho lde r at a 
critica l mo me nt. More specifica ll y. imm e diate ly a ft e r 1 = I. the o u t> ide ho lder acco rded thi s 
control power takes action a. which can e ither be acqu iescence a nd co nti nua nce C in present 
manage ment ope rations o r stoppage 5 of manage ment 's continued p ursuit of its business 
plan. S to ppage 5 ca n e ntail a ny numbe r of subseq ue nt ac tion s. including liquidnti o n, sale of 
a divis io n or othe r downsiz ing . or re directio n of inves tme nt po licy. Whateve r the actio n 
tak e n . fo r any give n signa l s. S e nta il s le ss ri sky subseq ue nt ma nage me nt than C. the 
probability distribution of which has fatte r uppe r a nd lower tails. At r = 2. np2 is rea lized and 
income is shared in accorda nce with th e contracts in the capital structure. /d. at I ()3 1-34. 
Inves tment. 
Co ntract 
t = 0 Choice 
ofe 
Realizat io n of np l 
and signal s 
t = I Action a take n 
R e alization o f np2 
t = 2 
The mode l exa mines two possible compe nsation ince nti ve sc he mes fo r E: o ne 
constituted of pri va te benefits o nl y and th e other in cluding a sa la ry. The p urpose o f a ny such 
sch e me is of course to induce E to choose a hi gh level e. But give n the m o del. and in 
particu la r the no ncontractibi li ty of s. the o ptim al a rran geme nt must inc luc\e a possibility of 
punishme nt in the form o f a contro l trans fer to o uts ide rs who have the powe r to choose 
action 5 . Since ma nageme nt a lways prefe rs C to S (whet her o r not C is e fficient ). a structure 
that incre ases the possibility o f such inte rvention as npl and s declin e le nds manage ment an 
ince ntive to ch oose a high leve l of e. maximizing th e possibility of a cho ice of C de spite the 
cos t of U the re by incurre d. G iven thi s. a ny bonus pa yme nts should be base d o n e arnings 
resul ts of both np l a nclnp2. with th e np2 target leve l ri sing as th e npl a m o unt de clines. It!. a t 
1035-39. 
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T he two different methods of con trol transfer, in the boardroom 
and through liq uidation, are suited to d iffe rent business outcomes. 
One acco rdingly would expect to see both employed in real world 
arrangements. Significantly , the CTM interpolates only two business 
situat ions - the selection of a from the range A in e~ and e, states. In 
practice, there will be an open-ended range of such fut ure choices: a 
from A, b from B, c from C, and so on, and e, and e" will cover a ra nge 
of outcomes. When such a choice concerns a change in the business 
plan o r the replacement of key personnel, whe ther in an e .. or e~ state, 
the boardroom control transfer mode is indicated. The, liquidat ion 
trigger, in contrast, is bet ter suited to se vere e, states ca lli ng for 
cli sinvestment. 111 
Another distinction between contro l transfer by rede mption and 
bankruptcy and control transfer by boardroom elect io n should be 
noted. The form er mode of transfer implies VC financing by a senior 
securi ty, whether debt or preferred. That is because when redemptio n 
causes insolvency, control devolves to VC beca use it holds a 
liq uid ation preference over E in the bankruptcy distribution. 
Boardroom control transfer can be (and often is) effected in a firm 
funded entirely with common stock and does no t implicate an 
inso lvency proceeding. This implies a real world preference for 
transfer by boardroom control transfer provisions over control 
transfer through redemption and liquidation if only because 
bankruptcy is costly in the real world.62 But the prediction must be 
qualified because redemption does not necessa rily lead to a 
bankruptcy proceeding. If the going concern re tains value, the 
trigge ring of the redemption right can become the occasion fo r 
renegotiation between VC and £. Since VC now has the option of 
forcing insolvency , it comes to the table with cognizable bargaining 
power.63 
2. Debt, Preferred, or Common? 
The foregoing discussion gives rise to two further questions a bout 
venture capital contracts: Why preferred stock and no t debt? A nd, 
why preferred and not common stock? To ask the former question is 
to note that th e periodic payment properties of noncumulative 
convertible preferred can be mimicked in part with a convertible 
6 1. For a model amplifying th e efficiency prope rties of creditors' li quida tion rights. see 
O li ver Han & John Moore, Defaulr and Renegorimion: A Dynamic Model of Dehr. 11 3 Q .J. 
ECON. 1 (1998). 
62. See supra tex t accompanying note 59. 
63 . If the going conce rn retains more value still , E can refinance and pay off VC. If VC 
is the party positioned to choose a* the result is suboptimal. 
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income bond . 1'~ Such a security would import the same high -powered 
incentives to E as does convertible preferred. \Vhere the prefe rred 
hold er gets an intermediate term right to put the stock back to the 
issuer, the convertible bondholder gets the substance of that right ·with 
intermediate term maturity. E ither way, VC gets a liquid ation 
preference tha t has the effect of raising the cost to E of poo r 
oer fo rmance.65 Packaging this convertible senior security as clc: bt 
~vou ld carry two additional benefits for VC: a higher and harder 
bankruptcy priority and a chance for a tax deduction on intt r<:~:o t 
payments. oo 
But A merican corporate la\v holds out a significant disincenti ve io 
the packaging of venture capital participation as cle ht. VCs commonly 
do more than monitor th eir investments and fac ilitate the hiring ot 
proCessional managers by their portfolio companies; th ey oftr::n com rol 
or influence the decision to replace the CEO and make othe r key 
business decisions.67 To the extent that the transact ion structure holds 
out the prospect of significant VC input in management, incl uding the 
power to specify business res ults , VC should act in the capacity of an 
equity securityholder at the time it exercises such control power. A 
deb tholder who exercises control power in that capacity loses its 
limited liability status, and could be personally liable to other creditors 
of the firm or even to E in the event its management decisions work 
out bad ly . 6~ D ebtholders can influence control while retaining limited 
liability only indirectly, by specifying default events ex ante in negative 
covenants. In order to structure meaningful control by a clebtholder, 
then, a basis of contractible subj ect matter is needed. In the 
alternative, a contingent control transfer to a debtholcler can be 
effected without risk of unlimited liability on the scenario posed by the 
CTM - defa ult , bankruptcy, emergence with VC in charge , 
64. Kaplan & Stromberg. supra note 12 (working paper at lS). report that pre ferred 
di vide nds are cumulat ive in on ly 46 % o f the cases. This sugges ts tha t periodic inco me is not 
a prima ry conce rn he re. 
65 . Klausner & Litva k, supra note 9 (working pape r at 10). 
66 . For the tax clecluction. a firm promise to pay would be necessary. The income 
contingency would not strengthe n the case . See Fin Hay Realty Co. v . U nited Sta tes_ 39S 
F.2d 694. 696 (3d Ci r. 196S). 
67. Kla usner & Li twak. supm note 9 (working pape r a t 4-5) . 
6S. T he class ic case. Mar tin v. Peyton . 158 N .E. 77 (N.Y. 1927 j . con<.:erm a loan to a 
partn<::rship. The li a bility of bank lt:ncle rs to small b usinesses is th e sub ject of le ading cases in 
recen t yea rs . S ee . e.g. . K.M.C. Co .. lnc. v_ Irving T rust Co ., 757 F.2cl 752 (6th Cir. 1 ~S5 ): State 
Nat ' l Bank of E l Paso v_ Fa rah Mfg. Co .. 678 S.W.2cl 661 (Tex. A pp 1984) . Sec genem!/1 
Margaret Ham brecht Douglas-Ha milton . Creditor Liabi!irit>s Resulting _ti-om Improper 
fnt erfi:rence 1vith the Managem el!l of u Finuncia/lv Troubled Dehtor_ 31 BLiS. LA W. 3--13 
(i 975). The r<:: is of course a way to deflect this ri sk to r a deb t hol ding VC with con t ro l power. 
If the VC is a huma n bei ng, one forms a wholly owned shell corpo ration or limi ted liabi lity 
company to hold the debt: if the VC is a corpora tio n, it fo rm s a she ll wh o ll y owned 
subsidi ary. Both steps are cos tly . and there remains a resi dual ri sk of veil pie rci ng. 
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presumably as the holder of all of the equity of a reorganized firm. But 
as noted above, bankruptcy costs make this a second-best alternative 
in real world planning. 
The preferred/common stock choice turns in part on priorities. In 
the CTM, E takes periodic return in salary t. If VC takes its position in 
common stock and E also holds some common as an incentive device , 
VC and E would share what is left of rat r = 2 pro rata, which would 
mean a double clip for E. If VC holds stock with an income preference, 
VC takes r-t, to the extent of the preference and any common stock 
held by E would pay in addition to t only to the extent that VC's 
preference is satisfied fully. More generally , in small business 
planning, preferred and debt are standard tools for compensating 
financial participants where the entrepreneurs take much of their 
share of free cash flows in the form of salary payments.m In addition, 
on downside scenarios preferred means a priority to whatever is left in 
liquidation.7° Finally, there is an exogenous regulatory concern. 
Regulated institutional investors participating in the venture capital 
partnership, such as insurance companies, will prefer to take their 
equity in the form of convertible senior securities so as to satisfy legal 
constraints on the amount of common stock in their investment 
portfolios. 71 
3. Shored Control 
We turn now to the CTM's assumption that even though o* cannot 
be specified in advance, the parties can, to the extent they deem s 
reliable, contract ex ante to change control for the purpose of making 
the selection of a* more likely. This setup is descriptive of 
innumerable instances in practice. Financial contracts routinely utilize 
such imperfect but verifiable signals. Such real world manifestations of 
s are the accounting and performance data utilized in the drafting of 
representations, closing conditions, covenants, and default triggers. 
69. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT E. THOMPSON. O'NEAL'S CLOSt: CORPORATIONS: 
LAW AND PRACTICE ~ 2.21 (3d eel. 1998). Sahlman. supra note 21. at 510. suggests an 
additional tax reason. The overhang of preferred rights lowers the value of the common for 
tax purposes. permitting E to buy the common stock at low prices without reporting taxable 
income on the differential between the amount paid and the greater amount paid by VC. See 
also Klausner & Litvak. supra note 9 (working paper at 9). 
70. One could presumably replicate the preferred stock outcome by placing in VC a 
combination of common stock and debt. This would. however. mean a process burden on 
VC in the event of exercise of control to make it clear that it acted in the capacity of a 
common stockholder. A residual litigation risk would endure even so. 
71. Incidence of insurance company participation in venture capital firms varies from 
year to year. PAUL A. GOiv!PERS & JOSH LERNER. THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 8-9 
tbl.l.l (1999). shows that insurance company and bank participation levels in venture capital 
partnerships amounted to l6'1o in 1978. 15°/r, in 1987. and 18% in 1995. but 4% inl979. 6% 
in !991 and I% in 1997. Public and private pension funds consistently arc the largest 
investors. putting in 40% of the capital in 1997. 
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Indeed, 15 % of the cases in Kaplan and Stromberg's sample specify 
boardroom con trol tr ansfers to VC based on a financi a l or 
performances. 
More diffi cult contracting problems arise where governance 
intervention needs to be specified but s is unre liable , unverifiable, or 
there is no s. lf we stay within the confines of the CTM, the lack of s 
means that noth ing exists to tri gger a transfe r of control and VC has to 
le t the in ves tment ride until l =2 . At that point , given a 8" sta te, VC's 
dividend and liquidation priorities assume paramo unt importance, but 
the payoff may be suboptimal. 
Le t us abandon the CTM's ha rd ass umptio ns respecting payouts to 
E and VC and the choice of act ion a.7" and instead ass ume that th e 
choice among a" and a,, on ec and 8" sta tes depends on complex and 
probabilistic factors so that the re is no clea r cut connection betwee n £ 
or VC control and the optimal choice of a. Although it always is 
optimal in th e model to leave E in charge on 8~ states, now it is 
plausible to suggest that VC could effect a *8~ simply by removing E 
and undertaking a search for a substitute chief executive better suited 
to grappling with the problems at hand and bringing about a*. But 
because the decision that a substitute is better fitted to effect a*8 
g 
follows from a complex business judgment, there may be no basis with 
which to provide for this control alloca tion ex ante. The same sort of 
problem could arise in an 8" state where correction remains possible, 
with the new CEO being charged with the job of turning the operation 
around. Such scenarios are be tter suited to treatment through the 
operation of a contractually instituted governance process than 
through adva nce contractual specification of a clear-cut outcome. 
Joint control suggests itself as a solution in these cases.73 In Aghion 
and Bolton's CTM, joint control is defined very narrowly to m ean that 
either E and VC both agree, or that in the event of disagreement , E 
will make a one-time, take-it-or-leave-it offer to VC as to choice of a; 
in the event that VC refuses the offer, deadlock results and the returns 
to both parties are zero. Such a joint control set up means tha t hole! 
ups are a possibility in every case. As a result, in Aghion and Bolton 's 
model , joint control always is dominated by unilateral or contingent 
control.74 
72. That is. th at yiJp, < yB,.a, and th at hfJ,a, < biJ,a,. 
73. For a form<JI model o f joi nt contro l in venture ca pital contexts in which con trol is a 
continuous va ria ble to be adj usted through diffe re nt contract provisions. sec And re i A. 
Kirilenko. Va!u111ion and Con1ro/ in Ve111ure Finance. 56 J. FIN. 565 (2001). This model. by 
opening up control to a ran ge . move s th e form al theory of the firm close r to Kaplan and 
Stromberg's real-world picture . lt does not however. specify any direct connections between 
its form al te rms and rea l world institutio ns. 
74. Aghion & Bolton. supra note 13. a t 486. 
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But joint control is not dominated if we change the CTM's 
assumptions. Contingent control dominates only because the model 
assumes a reliable s. Vvithout a reliable s, the negotiating parties would 
have a high-powered incentive to find a way to contract around the 
deadlock the model assumes. It comes as no surprise that any number 
of such devices show up in real world business planning practice. For 
example, VC could contract for a seat on the board of directors. 75 This 
ameliorates information asymmetries and irnports voice without the 
power to direct results - VC can attempt to intluence E without 
having a power to specify the choice of a. Alternatively, the parties 
could contract for fifty- fifty boardroom representation and interpolate 
a deadlock breaker, such as arbitration. Since this would be contingent 
on their failure to agree, it would not depend on the identification of 
an s. Such sharing arrangements are common in the world of contracts 
among equity par ticipan ts in small businesscs.76 Although not perfect, 
such solutions do amount to a plausible second best given the absence 
of a contractible contingency clearly indicating that control should be 
vested in E or VC. 
With this we return to Kaplan and Stromberg's results and the 
practice of shared control in venture capital startups.77 The contracting 
pattern suggests an interesting modification of the CTM's setup. As 
noted, contracts providing for contingent control transfer to the VC 
upon an s specified in advance are a minority. But this point also 
confirms the theoretical prediction that contracts in this context will 
manifest strategies for dealing with noncontractible subject matter.78 
The small number of such provisions bespeaks a judgment that the 
available signals are unreliable. It appears that both VC and E prefer 
to grapple with unverifiable facts attending eh states in the black box 
of the boardroom. 
75. Venture capital transactions include a separate "Investor Rights Agreement" 
entered into between the issuer and individual purchasers of preferred. These contracts 
customarily include a right to attend board meetings in a nonvoting capacity. Sec Craig E. 
Dauchy, Venture Capital Financings, in DOING DEALS 2000: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS 
AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 233 , 301 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac .. Course 
Handbook Series No. 1167,2000). 
76. O'NEAL & THOMPSON. supra note 69, at~§ 9.0-.38. 
77. For a contrasting discussion of shared control arrangements. see Armando Gomes & 
Walter Novaes. Sharing of Conrro! as a Corpomte Governance Mechanism (SSRN Elec. 
Paper Coli. No. 277111. 2001). ar http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=277lll. Gomes and Novaes 
model shared control as a governance mechanism for a firm with a dispersed minority 
shareholder interest. They hypothesize two blockholders who together control management 
decisions but cannot act unilaterally, and they show that in some circumstances such an 
arrangement could be superior to either of control by a single blockholder or widely 
dispersed shareholding. 
78. The practitioner literature shows that this is effected by a shareholder voting 
agreement pursuant to which. in the event that performance targets are not met. E promises 
to vote for additional directors nominated by VC. Dauchy. supra note 75. at 243. 
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During the noncontractible period between t = 0 and r = 2, ·ve, 
instead of waiting for a veri fiable signal, takes a noncontrolling 
position inside the firm's boardroom. In the boardroom there are 
three directors, E. V C, and a ne utral third actor selected by both . So 
long as the three agree, control is shared. In the event of disagreement 
be tween VC and £ , the mutually se lected third director holds the 
balance of power. By hypothesis, VC and E will compete to influence 
the third director. Suppose performance has been mediocre and VC 
would like to remove and replace E as CEO. If the thi rd director is 
motivated to enhance firm value and VC persuades the third director 
that the move is necessary fo r ac hievement of an 8,. state, E is ou t. A t 
the same time, E also has access to the third direc-tor and can state a 
defense. 79 
Compare the more limited menu of con tro l transfer devices in the 
CTM. T here, if no transfe r occurs by advance specification but 
performance incentives turn out to be dysfun ctional, you contract into 
the optimal performance state only by means of a Coasian bribe . 
Interestingly, this item is always on the reai world menu. Nothing 
stops a VC in the tripa rtite shared-control arrangement from making a 
similar bribe either to the third director or to E. Nor does anything 
stop the third director from initiating this discussion and holding out 
for a side payment. But a persuasive substantive pitch to the third 
director costs VC less than a bribe. By hypothesis, then, the ideal third 
director has a strong reputational interest in being seen as an 
impartial, expert maker of good-faith business judgments who pursues 
firm value from a neutral stance and is impervious to Coasian bribes. 
This lets the firm reach a* without barriers stemming from ex ante 
wealth endowments or insufficient expected value of the projec t in e,,. 
For the reputational constraint to work, the third director would have 
to be an actor known in a business community common to both E and 
VC. Here, as in G ilson and Black's description, the real world patte rn 
of close geographic proximity between E and VC would be facilitative: 
the third director should also live in the neighborhood. Similar 
reputational concerns may constrain the VC before forming an 
alliance with the third director against E. The VC who engineers too 
many E replacements or, worse , abuses its power, can be shut out of 
future deals with the best £s_xo 
79 . For a comparison ve nture ca pital form, which provides for VC control on a three out 
of five basis, see 1 M ICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL.. VENTU RE CAPITA L AN D PUB LI C 
O FFERI NG NEGOTIATION§ 8-23 (3d eeL 2000). 
80. Black & Gilson. supra no te 17 , at 262-63: Sahlman. supra note 7. at 513; see also 
Kirilenko. supra note 73 . at 570 (noting th a t ·'ve nture ca pital firms a re grea tly di ffe re ntiated 
by reputation' '). 
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4. Implications 
T he shared control structure's real world dominance over the 
alternative of VC control or hardwired control transfers suggests that 
Es have significant but not decisive barga inin g power, presumably 
because VCs compete to fin ance the most promising e ntre pre ne urs. It 
also suggests that an arra ngement positioning coopera tion in the 
shadow of a threatened control transfe r has productivity advantages. 
Certainly. there is evidence of significant CEO turnover in the venture 
capita l fi e lcl. 81 Thus, to the extent the venture ca pi ta l in teres t can be 
protected satis factoril y without outright boardroom co ntro l, one 
wo uld expect shared control to dominate over ve nture capitalist 
control. 
A recent story in th e busin ess press re inforces this description of 
shared contro l in venture cap it al portfo lio companies. R obert E. 
D avo li, a VC with a notable num ber of wildly successful high 
technology investments in the years preceding 2000, a lso is known for 
an aggressive posture respecting the tenure of his £s. H e has fired six 
of twenty-four in a five-year period . The result is a reputation as an 
impatient VC, in contrast to the more passive postures of the " instant" 
VCs who, chasing the trend , entered the business in the late 1990s. 
This is said to make Davoli a throw back to the heroic clays of venture 
capital in the 1960s, when pioneers like Arthur Rock and Thomas J . 
Perkins took a hands-on role. Meanwhile , Davoli is said to be subject 
to a constraint when attacking an E for missing a performance targe t. 
He must first mobilize the board.x2 
Even as this story describes a world of shared contro l, it suggests 
cau tion with the foregoing account. First , venture capital 
arrangements may have evolved in hi story, with VC control being the 
practice in an early phase and shared control becoming more 
prominent as more capital came to pursue fewer deals with a more 
sophistica ted generation of Es. Second , shared control m ay mean 
diffe rent things in different portfolio companies. Many factors can 
come to bear when the third director is se lected . VC is likely to have 
Sl. GOMPERS & L ERNER. supra note 7 1. at 176-78, repo rts turnover in 40 o ut of 220 
ven ture capi tal rounds in their da ta se t. M.T. H annan et a l .. Jnerlia and Change in !he Early 
Years: Employment Relarions in Young, High Technology Firms , 5 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANG E 503 (1996) , finds that in the first twenty months following a firm 's initi al round of 
ve nture capi ta l finance, 20% of firms replace E with a non fo under CE O : the percentage 
goes up to 40% afte r fo rty months and SO% after e ighty months. See also Klausner & Litvak. 
supra no te 9 (working paper a t 6) . 
82 . J ohn A. Byrne, How a VC Does !1 . Bus. WK .. July 24, 2000. at 97. More ge nera lly. 
" high-repu tation VCs te nd to replace CEOs mo re ofte n than low-reputa ti o n VCs do." 
Klausne r & Litvak. supm note 9 (working paper at 6). For a di scussion of the problem s a n E 
faces in ch oosing a VC and a description of a reputati ona l market for VC services. see D. 
Gordon Smith. Vemure Capiral Conlracring in rhe l nformarion Age. 2 J. SMALL & 
EM ERGING Bus. L. 133 (1998). 
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the more extensive ne twork of potenti al candidates . Information 
asymmetri es and differentia ls in bargaining pmver and skill could 
mean that the ''indepe ndent" ' third director is highly susceptible to the 
influence of the VC (or, as seems less like ly. to the influence o f £). If 
neootia tions work svstematicallv to fa vo r VC intluence, the rea l world 
::-:> J -
of shared control may not be materi ally di ssimilar from that of the 
standard picture o f VC control. 
Consider in thi s regard a technical poin t respecting the contro l 
sharing mechanism. As a matte r of contract p lanning, it is never 
eno ugh forE and VC to agree to agree on the third director. One must 
a lso provide for the possibility that E and VC mi ght fail to agree on a 
canclid a te.8 ~ W itho ut a deadlock-breaking a rr ~mgcmen t a t th e selection 
stage. a board o f two can emerge and make costly deadlock a 
poss ibility. T he standard close co rporation dra fting solution is to 
provide for the intervention ol a neut ra l arbitrato r at this point.84 The 
legal litera ture suggests th at a low-cost but somewhat arbitrary 
a lte rnative approach is utilized in some venture capital deals. Under 
this, the charter provides that E's class of stock elects one director, 
VCs class of stock elects one director, and the third director is elected 
by all the stock, voting as a single class. ~'' Assuming that E and VC 
each have one vote pe r share and do not ho ld exactly the same 
number of shares, the result in a case of disagreement is that the 
winning third-seat candidate will be nominated by the actor with the 
larger absolute number of shares. Absent some other arrangement 
constraining the exercise of voting power, this means that in the event 
of disagreement , the party with the share voting majority controls all 
significant firm decisions. According to Kaplan and Stromberg's 
numbers, this contracting solution favors the VC in the majority of 
cases. 
We have assayed th e dynamics of shared control without asking a 
fundamental question: Why have shared control in most cases, full VC 
control in a significant minority of cases . and full E control in a smaller 
minority of cases? What factors distinguish the three classes of 
transactions? On a standard agency cost analysis we should expect to 
see greate r control rights in VC in transactions holding out greater 
information asymmetries and adverse selection problems.x6 A line of 
tl3 . O ne also needs to control the size of the board. The prac titioner litera ture contains 
an exe mplar o f a VC. E voting agreement con ta ining a provision requiring unanimous 
consent to increase the size o f the board. Lawrence B. Low, Venture Capiwl Agreements. in 
NUTS AND BOLTS OF FI NANCIAL PRODUCTS: UNDE RSTANDING TH E EVO LVING WOR LD OF 
CAPITA L MARK ET AN D INVESTMENT MANAGEM ENT PRO DUCTS 31 3. 413 (PLI Corp. L. & 
Prac .. Course Handbook Se ries No. 1035 . 199R). 
R4 . See Ringling Bros.-Ba rnum & Ba iley Combined Shows v. Ringling. 53 A.2d 441 
(Del. 1947): O' NEA L & THOiviPSON. supra note 69. at§ § 9.0-.38. 
85 . Dauchy. supra note 75 . at 316. 
86. Malcom P. Bake r & Paul A. Gompers. Execwive 0 1vnership and Com rol in Newlv 
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theo retical economics expands on this poin t m deta il. Thomas 
I-Iellrna n focuses on ba rga ining power and produ ctivity variables. He 
::1sks why E \voulcl surrender control in the firs t place, since surrender 
of control creates the possibility that at some point after startup VC 
\vill terminate E as CFO and substitute a professiona l manager.P H 
\/C always has all the bargain ing power , the question is easily 
cn!S\Vered - E has no other way to access capitaL But, notes Hellman. 
a puzzle ar ises in a world where Es can access al tema tive (and more 
pT:;sive) so urces of capital. Alternalively, an E with an attr8.ct ive-
!ooking project acquires ba rgaining power when multiple VCs 
compete [or the opportunity to participate . In :Hel lman's mode l. VC 
contro l is rnore likely, and replace inent of E more fre quent , where 
profess ional rnanage rTlent substitutes add value . Es tend to be 
unpn,duct ive , Es de rive low p rivate benefits from contro l, and VC; 
have greater bargaining power.~0 In the alternative. Kir ilenko offers an 
incomple te contracts mode l which shows that more con trol comes to 
VC with higher degrees of adverse selection. In this model, as control 
is surrendered to VC, E can be expected to take a giVe back in the 
form of more advantageous financial t erms . ~N 
II . THE P REFERRED STOCK P ROBLEM I N T HE VENTURE CAPITAL 
CONTEXT 
The theore tical case for preferred stock as a financing vehicle for 
venture capital, thus described, is robust. B ut problems inhere in the 
legal fra mework that encases preferred stock. This Part describes 
those problems and the con tractual solutions that have evolved in the 
vent ure capital context. \Vhen we emerge from this discussion , venture 
ca pital preferred will still be in a robust condition. B ut it will have a 
few weaknesses in need of attention . 
i'-L The Preferred Stock Problem 
T he "preferred stock problem " is wrought into the historical 
perform ance of publicly traded preferred . T he classic description of 
the problem can be foun d in G raham and Dodd's treati se on 
corporate finance . Graham and Dodd warned value inves tors agains t 
investment in preferred stock, observing that it did not behave like a 
senior security should on all downside scenarios. T he dividen d 
Pu hlic Finns. The Role of Venture Cupillllists (SS RN Elec. Paper Cull. No. ln5173. 19YY) . 111 
h ttp:/ipapc rs.ssrn.com/a bstract=l n5173. 
~n . Hellman. supm note 13, at 58. 
S8. /d . a t 60. 
;~lJ. Kirilcnko . supm nok 73. at 579-80. 
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preference worked well in good times; the liquidation preference 
maintained senior status [n extreme distress situations. T he problem 
Jay in the midd le , with the issuer who found itself struggling to gain or 
maintain a position in a hostile product market. T he struggling issuer 
could cut off periodic payments to the preferred indefinit e ly, putting it 
in the position of a residual interest holder, even as the iss uer kept 
current its interest and principa l payments on subordinated debt. 
Avoidance ot a bankruptcy filin g gave the issuer a powerful incentive 
to maintain the cash flows on the debt.911 It had no comparab le 
incentive to keep current on the preferred. Contractual provision for 
the cumulation of missed preferred dividends did no t correct th e 
incentive problem. As between al locating a doll ar to a prei'erred 
dividend or enhancing the business plan, the struggiing issue r ahvays 
chose the latter. A n overhang of preferred dividend arrcaragcs could 
be dealt with later, after a turnaround in the product market. Often 
that turnaround never happened. 
Even the preferred of the most highly rated issuers failed to pass 
inspection in Graham and Dodd's risk-averse framework. Highly rated 
preferred, they said , offered only the slightest step up in yield over 
comparable subordinated debt. This did not adequately compensate 
for the contractual risks. 91 The preferred stock form, Graham and 
Dodd concluded, was "fundamentally unsatisfactory. "9~ Anticipating 
the CTM, they opined that preferred made sense 011ly under a 
contract providing that suspension of the payment stream triggered a 
transfer to the preferred of voting control over the firm. But they 
entered a caveat here too. Even if the contract provided for voting 
control, it was not safe to assume that it would be ·'intelLigently 
utilized"93 by a dispersed group of small holders. 
Graham and Dodd's negative analysis has proved predictive. 
Usage of preferred as a mode of finance by mature firms declined 
markedly in the latter part of the twentieth century. Pu blicly issued 
preferred persists in substantial volume only in the capital structures 
of firms in regulated industries, such as banks and public utilities. For 
these firms, preferred issues make cost sense as a means of satisfying 
regulatory mandates to increase the base of equity capital.94 
Opinions nonetheless will differ as to whether Graham and Dodd 's 
blanket disapproval should be taken seriously tod ay. Their depression-
90. BENJf\tviiN G RA H A M ET AL.. SECU RITY ANAL YSJ S: PRINCII'AL.S AND T ECHN IQUE 
379 (4th eel. 1962). 
9 1. !d. at 382: see uiso SIDNEY CO"ITL E ET AL.. GRAHAi\,1 A ND O O DD·s SECURITY 
AN~\ LYS IS 470-74 (5th cd. 1988) . 
92. GRAHA!vl ET AL. supru note 90, a t 375, 
93. !d. at 381. 
94. RI CH A RD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 392-93 (6th eel. 2000). 
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e ra risk aversion rings hollow in the contex t of the risk neutrality of 
modern financial economics. Sure ly, says the contemporary observer. 
actors in the capita l marke ts will have devised so lutions to any 
contracting problems. The contemporary preference for subordinated 
debt ove r prefe rred should be a ttributed to the tax system and the 
age ncy cost adva ntages o f debt capitali zat ion95 rat he r than to any 
intri ns ic infirmity in the preferred stock fo rm .')6 Inte res t payments are 
deduct ible by the issuer wh ere preferred dividend payments arc not, 
making debentures the cheaper mode of Cinancing for issue rs with 
substa ntia l inco me tax li abilities97 - so much chea per tha t the cost 
ba lance tends to tip only in the case of regulated iss ue rs. 
Obse rvers schooled in corporate law will be less quick to discard 
Graham <md Dodd's nega tive judgmen t on the preferred stock 
contrac t. The lega l track record of publicly issued preferred , viewed 
from th e inves tor's point o f view, has been as dismal as was the 
fin ancia l performance ot pub lic utili ty preferred iss ues l1l the 
depression era .')o To a reade r of case law on preferred stock contracts , 
Graham and Dodd got it exactly right: absent voting contro l and a 
means o f surmounting collective act ion problems in its exe rc1se, 
Y5 . Michael C. J e nse n. !lgency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finun cl.', and 
Takeovers. 76 AM ER. ECO N. RE V. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1Y86). 
%. C( Robe rt H e inke l & J ose f Zechne r. Th e Role of Debt and Pre(erred Swck as a 
Solution tu Adverse Investmen t Incentives. 25 J . FIN. & QUA NT. ANAL. 1 ( 1990) (showi ng 
that preferred creates incenti ves for the firm 's common holde rs to in vest. a nd thus 
ameliorates the und e rinvestment problem that foll ows from the iss uance o f debt: a new issue 
of preferre d n1unt c rs the agency costs of debt. and th ere by not only e nhances th e firm' s de bt 
capacity hut in creases the ove ra ll va lue o f the firm ). 
Y7. VICTOR BRUDNEY & W ILLI Ai'vl W. BRATI'ON. BRU DNE Y & C HIR.ELSTE IN'S CASES 
AND M .-\TER IALS ON COR PORATE F INANCE 337-38 (4 th e el. 1993). Som e of thi s re la tive 
di sa dva ntage is mack up by the intercorporate divide nd e xclusion. under whi ch corpora te 
ho lders o f prefe rred can exclude a subs tantial percentage of dividends rece ived from the ir 
co rpora te tax ba ses. I.R. C. ~~ 243. 244 ( lYYO). The result is that prefe rred. particu larly if 
issued by <l hi gh-gra de public utility, ca n offer a n a ttractive opportunity to in s urance 
co m pa ni es a nd ot her corpora te ins tituti o na l in ves tors. The lax bene fit mea ns a lower yie ld 
a nd cos t of cap it a l to the issuer. Dona ld E. Fische r & Glen n A. Wi lt , Non-Convertible 
Preferred Stuck os o Financing !nstrttment 1950-/965. 23 J. F IN. 6ll (196o). Sho rt-te rm 
fl oating ra te preferred with divid e nd rates tied to short-te rm interest rates a lso m akes use of 
the inte rcorporate cliviclencl exclusio n. T his paper is o ften issued by banks and sold to 
corporatio ns with excess cash ava il able for short-te rm investme nt , fo r which it makes an 
attrac tive alte rnati ve to short-term de bt in strume nts. 
A no th er tax dodge al so must be no te d. In the mi cl- 1990s. inves tm e nt banke rs put the 
corporate trust dev ice to use in inve nting tax deductible prefe rred. Here the corporation 
ra isin g the capital iss ues bonds to a special purpose trust. The trust in turn raises the capital 
to pay fo r the bonds by issuing pre ferred stock to co rpo rate taxpayers . T he ultim a te c re dit 
on the deal takes an inte rest ded uction while the ultimate sources o f capital get th e 
inte rcorpora te divide nd exc lusio n. By the e nd of 1997 . more than 285 o f these iss ues we re 
o utstanding: they had ra ise d $27 bi llio n. A run Kha nna & John J. McConne lL J\1/Ps, QUIPs 
AND TOPrs: Old Wine in Nnv Soules. 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FI N. 39 (1998). 
98 . See Robert M. Bla ir-Smi th & Le onard H e lfenstein. A Dea th Sentence or u New 
Leuse on Life? A Su rvey of Corporate Adjustments under the Public Utili ty Holding 
Company Act. 9-'1 U. PA . L. RE V. 148. 150-51. 162-69 (1946). 
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preferred holders are vulnerable to issuer opportunism. In bad times, 
they are the victims of opportunistic recapitalizations and one-sided 
renegotiations pursuant to which their preference rights are stripped 
~ . ~ . 
for the beneftt of the common stock. In good ttmes, contractual 
legerdema in incident to mergers and acquisitions can lead to the same 
results. again transferring value from their pockets to those of the 
common stockholders. 
Furthermore. preferred's lega l position de teriorated markedly 
over the course of the twentieth century. Prio r to ! 940, some of these 
opportunistic transactions were held by state cour ts to violate 
cons titutional property rights. But that ··vested rights'' th eory of 
judicial protection fell out of favor. This can he attributed in part to 
the ascendency of realist and collectivist jurispmdcnce during the New 
Deal. 1uo Charter competition also played a rok. Delaware has seen 
that the interes ts of the managers who choose states of incorporat ion 
are aligned with the common stockholders agai nst preferred and other 
senior security holders and shaped its case law accordingly. 101 Today's 
cases hold out no fiduciary or other protective doctrine to substitute 
for the defunct vested rights approach. As a result , public preferred 
holders have to rely on the literal terms of their contracts to protect 
against issuer opportunism. From the evidence of the litigated cases, 
the contracts never evolved so as to close all the loopholes and 
provide reliable protection. 102 
From the legal perspective, then, the eclipse of preferred as a 
financing vehicle for mature firms may reflect dysfunctional 
contracting in addition to tax disadvantages. Under this view, it is not 
safe to assume that the legal framework encasing a given mode of 
')9 . It should be noted that a surrende r of rights by a c lass of pre ferred in co nnection 
wi th a dis tressed issuer"s recapita lization is not per se unfair. Sometimes the common stock 
has rights too. as where both the preferred and the common have to vote as a cl ass to 
approve a charter a me ndme nt or merge r that will make the firm as a whole more va luable. 
In such a case. the common will not support the transac tion unless it is allocated a part of the 
proceeds. Res ponsible managers do the ir bes t to g ive th e common eno ugh to garner its 
support but otherwise respect the rights of the prefern:cl. The c la ssic case is Gold111an v. 
Postal Telegraph, Inc.. 52 F. Supp. 763 (D . De l. 1943). 
100. See Davison v. Parke , Austin & Lipscomb. 35 N.E.2d 618. 622 (N.Y. 1941): 
NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CO RPORATIONS 573-82 (2cl eel. 1971). The legal 
landscape surrounding bonds also cha nge d drastically during the course of the twentieth 
century. Fiduciary duties to bondholders today are hypothe sized by law review 
commentators. No significant case supports the m. ln the 1920s. fiduciary duties to 
bondholders we re eve ryday subject ma tte r in litigated cases. See. e.g , Cha rles H. Haines, Jr. . 
Comment, Corpormions - Modificarion Provisions of Corporate ivlortgages and Trusl 
!nce111ives. 38 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1939). 
101. The leading Delaware case is Federal Uni1ed Corp. \'. f-!11\ ender. J 1 A.2d 331 (De l. 
1940). 
102. ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PE RSPECTIVE 266 ( 1976): Victor 
Brudney, Srandards of Fairness and !he Limils of Preferred Srock i'vlodijicaliuns. 26 
RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973): Lawrence E. Mitchell. Tlze Pu zz ling Problem of Preferred 
Stock (And Wlzy We Should Care A bow II) . 51 Bus. LAw. 443 (1996 ). 
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fin ance has evolved so as to foster firs t-best contractual risk 
allocations. m> For preferred boiders, ocr Graham and Dodd, the legal ' ~ 
environment makes voting control the sine qua non of adequate 
protection . There results a st icking point. Mature issuers will be 
unwilling to concede voting control to senior security holders whose 
capital contribution amounts to a minority proportion of the firm ·s 
equity base. Unless the contract is carefully drafted to vest the 
preferred wi th critical vetoes, the contract can be unilateral ly 
amended to remove or modify the preferred's rights to the benefit of 
the common . 1 "~ Preferred stock contracts drafted wit h the degree of 
precision necessary to assure 100% protection against such ex post 
stripping of value have been the exception and not th e rule . A species 
of bargain ing impasse results- an impasse making the publicly issued 
preferred of a ma ture firm unlikely to carry an advantageous price 
when compared to a subordinated debenture . 
The subsections that follow describe the preferred stock problem 
in greater detail. The discuss ion picks up the contracting pattern 
described in Part I, distinguishing injuries that stem from the absence 
of control of the boardroom from injuries that stem from the absence 
of a majority of the votes at shareholders' meetings. Section B will 
return to venture capital preferred to gauge the degree of success VCs 
have had in solving the problems. 
1. Control in the Boardroom 
Recall that in the CTM, the firm 's central governance problem 
concerns the allocation of the power to select a maximizing course of 
action a* given suboptimal incentives on the part of the holders of the 
firm 's commo n equity. In practice, whether such a critical choice 
implicates investme nt policy, dividend po licy, the decision to se ll or 
liquidate the fi rm, or amendment of the firm 's char ter, the lega lly 
constituted governance structure of the corporation vests the power to 
make the decision in the boardroom. In some cases, as with mergers 
(and asse t sell-o uts) , liquidations , and charter amendments, approval 
of the shareholders also must be bestowed at a second stage. But the 
board still controls the agenda and acts as the first-stage gatekeeper. 
So, to re turn to the problem described by Graham and Dodd, when an 
issue of preferred loses value because it pays no dividends at a time 
103. For expositions of thi s view. see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner. 
Srandurdi~urion and fnnovurion in Corporure Conrrucring (or '"The Economics n( 
!Joifapfure '" ). X3 Y A. L. REv. 713 ( 1997). ami Michae l K lausner. Corpomrions. CorporaTe 
Lmv, and NeMorks of Conrmcrs, ti I VA. L. REV. 757 ( 1995). 
104. A promise to pay ca n be inse rte d into the preferred stock contrac t in addition to 
dividend priority. The promise is not of the same order. howe ver, as the promise to pay debt. 
Since dividends canno t be paid wh ere debt is outstanding in distre ss situ a tions. the promise 
is inh ere ntly conditional. 
~ ... 
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when the firm possesses free cash flow, the problem presupposes tha t 
the preferred lack contro l or influence in the boardroom. 
o. Vuln erobi!ity: Preferred Absenr Control or Shared Control. The 
facts of Equity- Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adoms,105 the leading case 
deciding a dispu te respecting preferred stock issued to a venture 
capital investor, provide a more particular description of the problem. 
T his sad story starts in the portfolio company's fifth year. Called 
Genta Inc .. it hac\ successfull y completed startup and gone public. At 
the time ot its IPO, G enta sold a second round batch of preferred , $3U 
million ·worth. to a group of venture capitalists (VC). The prefe rred 
was at the weak end o f the contract protection range - VC neither 
contro lled nor shared cont rol in the boardroom and d id not ho ld a 
voting majority of the shares. Jun 
Genta needed the ca pita l to uperationalize a cluster of intell cc twll 
property rights in ge netic research. Three years later, in mid-1996. 
nothing operational had come up. A second operating division of the 
company was at work on an application but had yet to produce a 
positive cash flow. A third division had a small biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing operation with a positive cash flow. Despite these 
efforts, Genta was running out of cash. Indeed, the company as a 
whole had consumed $100 million over eight years withou t re turning a 
doll ar. Dr. Thomas A dams (the£) was the CEO. 
E was determined to stay in control and buy more time. Since VC 
had refused to invest further capital, investment bankers were hired to 
scare up new financing, equity or debt. Meanwhile, VC pressured E 
and his board of directors to sell off the firm 's assets and distribute the 
lion 's share of the proceeds to it. E resisted. U nfortunately for VC. its 
contracts gave it no rights with which to force the issue . Genta had a 
near-term duty to redeem the preferred, but Genta could sat isfy the 
duty with either cash or common stock. Since Genta had no cash, the 
redemption had to be in stock. Genta's problem was that as the 
redemption date approached, Nasdaq was initiating delisting 
proceedings because Genta no longer met minimum standa rds. 
·Meanwhile , delisting was classified in the preferred stock contrac t as a 
"fundam ental change" tha t triggered a cash redemption right. T his put 
E in a race against the clock. He had to find new fin ancing and 
stabilize the firm 's cash flow position before Nasdaq deli sted the 
common stock, triggering the cash redemption. 107 Since there was no 
way to finance a cash redemption, triggering meant a defensive 
105. 705 A.2cl1040 (De l. Ch. 1997). 
106. !d. at 1043-44. 
107. !d. at 1045-52. 
928 .Mich igan Low R evie1v [Vo l. JOIJ:o9 l 
bankruptcy filing to prevent the preferred from executing a judgment 
aga inst all of the asse ts o f the company. 10s 
E and Genta managed to win the race by a nose , stalling Nasdaq 
by begging for more time even as they closed a desperation financing 
with a firm called Aries. run by a Dr. R ose nwald. In exchange for a $3 
million loa n, secured by Genta's assets. Genta gave Aries control of 
the board along with a fistful of warrants and conve rsio n rights that 
carried majority vot ing control of the firm . Aries promised to use its 
best e ffo rts to raise more cap ital ; if it did not ra ise another $3 .5 million 
in six months, it wo uld lose its r ight to nomin ate a majority of the 
G enta board. E's continued status was not clea r. Apparentl y, Aries 
could des ign ate its own CEO. VC protested the deal, offering to 
advance a slightly large r amount of cash on the same terms. The 
Genta board refused the offer. It s contract having fa iled it , VC 
decided to seek judicia l protection in Delaware. Genta's s tat e of 
incorporation. 100 
For VC to have to go to court was to admit contract failure. Yet 
V C's contract followed the overall pattern predicted by the CTM -
having repayment of the senior security come due in the eve nt of eh. 
Here, by implication , a*8~> was not a new business plan for the going 
concern but the sale on a going concern basis of the firm 's producing 
assets. More than crumbs off the table were at stake: G enta had one 
profitable division; Aries saw realizable assets worth at least $3 
million. Unfortunately, the delay in triggering the cash redemption 
right engineered by E had a disastrous impact on the value of VC's 
interest. While VC sat on its hands waiting for Nasdaq, the closing of 
the Aries loan gave Aries a priority interest to the proceeds of a 
liquidation of the producing assets. In th e terms of the CTM , the 
contingent control transfer provision in this venture capital contract 
relied on an s- Nasdaq de listing- that was manipulable in addition 
to being observable and verifiable . The delay in triggering put VC in 
the position Eastern Airlines' bondholders had experienced a decade 
earlier - watching the transfer of thei r co llateral to parties providing 
new capital as the firm 's insiders speculated on a low-probability 
turnaround. 
Any number of contracting strategies could have ave rted this 
problem. For example , an old-fashioned business covenant prohibiting 
the incurrence of new debt and triggering a cash redemption right 
would have chilled the Aries deal. In the alternative , the drafter might 
have expanded the men u of rede mptio n triggers, keying the additional 
entries to nega tive information generated by Genta , such as cash flow 
or other financial measures or production targe ts. This re turns us to 
l08. /d. a t 1044 n.6. 
109. /d . a t lOS0-52. 
l 
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the problem of identifying an appropriate s. Like the CTM's s, rea l 
world proxies tend to be impe rfec t. Indeed , as recent events 
surrounding the Enron bankruptcy have reminded us, many 
accounting figures used as contracting signa ls are manipulable. The 
so lution to that problem li es in the provision of a long menu of 
triaaers. But this can prese nt its own ope ra tiona l problems. for tri gQers co . -~ 
can go off too early or too la te . O f course, an ea rly triggering in vi tes 
waiver by VC and attendant renegot iatio n. But to the ex tent E has 
bargaining power, the waive r arg ument will no t be ex ante persuasive. 
In sum, the evo lution o r an effect ive se t of triggers can tak e exper ie nce 
across genera tions of contracts. Meanwhil e, an outside, noncontroll ing 
VC is always be tter oft with th a n \vitho ut o ne. 
In the alternative . the prefe rred stock contract might have granted 
VC control of th e hna rd ot directors or a sea t o n the board with <t 
chance to influence a ne utral o uts ide director. As we have seen. most 
venture capi ta l contracts do bestow one or the other. With VC in 
charge in the boardroom, Gc nta would have been steered toward 
orderly liquidation, no las t-ditch fin ancing would have been in the 
works, and no one would have bothered to del ay Nasdaq de listing. 
With board control, investment and dividend policy no longer presents 
a problem from preferred's point of view. In some situations the VC 
control solution will be problematic from an efficiency point of view, 
of course - this is a fundamental insight of the CTM. How like ly is 
VC control to mean inefficient choices? Certainly, in this context the 
debt-like characteristics of preferred participation should not 
contribute to this risk of suboptimal decisionmaking by causing the 
preferred to e rr on the side of ri sk aversion in framing an investment 
plan. If we put E's private be nefit s to one side, the conversion 
privilege aligns the long-te rm inte rests of the preferred and common 
in 8~ states . Interests dive rge in 8" states, where, as in Adams, VC will 
be ready to give up and liquidate earlier than will E. H ere both the 
CTM and the fa cts in Adams suggest that VC control in 81, states is 
likely to be a superior arrangement. 
b. L egal Framework. Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams provides a 
good example of the judicial trea tment accorded to preferred cla ims. 
The regime of judicial enforcement bears directly on the burden facing 
the drafter of the preferred stock contract. Unless courts provide a 
protective backstop aga inst opportunistic transfers of value and 
stripping of rights, any contract package falling short of giving the 
preferred outright boardroom control implies a risk of opportunism 
unless its drafter manages to specify all salient contingencies. 
Unfortunately, D elaware law holds out no serio us promise or 
fiduciary protect ion against Issuer opportunism for prefe rred 
stockholders. Under Delaware law, the preferred share the role of 
fiduciary beneficiary with th e common only with respect to elem ents 
of preferred participation constituting an equity participation identical 
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to that of the common. Accordingly, the preferred have a cause of 
act ion along with the common where management engages in self-
dealing tran sactions or negligently misman ages the firm . In contrast, 
where a preferred claim arises from rights an d prefere nces not shared 
with the common, the Delaware courts characterize the claim as 
contractual rather than fiduciary. 110 They then read the contract 
narrowiy.111 
Accordingly, counsel for V C in Adams needed to construct a claim 
that clicl not derive from the liquidation prefcr;::nc;; a nd ins tead went to 
the stock's core equity participatio n. It cle verly did this by making 
reference to the Delaware fidu ciary rul es constraini ng management 
defensive tactics against hostile takeovers . l'viorc particularly, it 
attacked the Aries deal as sale of contro l within Revlon , Inc. v. 
i'v!acAndrews & Forbes Ho ldings. In c . . 11 ' presenti ng VC in the capacity 
of an equityholder (rather than in the capacity of a senior 
securityholder), protesting management's fai lure to ac t to maximize 
the value of the firm in connection with a control transfer. If the deal 
was within R evlon , the VC argued. then the Gen ta board had a duty to 
maximize the value received in exchange for the control transfer. By 
refusing VC's better offer, it breached the duty. 
T he Delaware Chancery court rejected the theory, despite a 
significant counterfactual acknowledgment. It admitted that in an 
open auction for the company he ld at the time of the Aries deal, VC's 
interest in accessing the proceeds of liquidation would have caused its 
bid to be the highest: 
Assume, for example. that the present value of the fi rm's prospects as a 
goin g concern would be only $9 million (net). which is also its liquidation 
va lue . Assume that in an open bidding contest. a we ll in for med bidder 
will offer th e company something less than 3 million for a 51% interest 
( i. e .. $9mm + $3m m = $12mm divided by 2 = $6mm: but since in 
liquidation the common stock wo uld be worthless. the bidder would be 
unlikely to bid the maximum $6mm value on these assumptions). 
Assume such a $3mm bid would permit th e common stock some further 
opportunity to see a payoff in the com pany labs and in the marketplace. 
Now assume that a bidding contest occurs in wh ich the preferred takes 
part. What will probably happen ? The preferred 's aim might be simply to 
liquidate the company and take all of the net proceeds and apply it to its 
preference . This will prevent its exploitation by the common and cut its 
110. 51'1' Jc dwab v. MG!vf Grand Hotels. Inc .. 509 A.2 d 584 (Del. Ch . 1986): Dalton v. 
A m. lnv. Co .. 490 A.2d 574 (De l. Ch. 1985) . 
11 1. Kaiser Al uminum Corp. v. Matheson. 681 A.2d 392 (De l. 1996) ( refusin g to resort 
to extrinsic evidence in interpre ting pre fe rred stock contract and instead employing the 
maxim of interpretation conrm profcrcnrum ); Wa rn er Communications Inc. v. C ris-Craft 
Indus .. Inc .. 83 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989) (int erpre ting language lite rally protecting prefe rred 
stockholders against them) . 
112. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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losses. To accomplish that go c.\1. the pre fe rred could easily puy in an 
auction up to $21 millio n ($30 million liquidati on prefere nce minus 
present net liquidation va lue) becw se tha t amount wou ld go iP to the 
company's treasury but co uld be immed ia te ly restored to the preferred 
wh en it exercised its vo ting puwcr to ca use the liquidation of the firm.1 1' 
But the competit ive bidd ing ::.;cena rio did not determine the result in 
the court's fiduciary analysis. The quest ion for purposes of fiduciary 
Jaw, it reasoned, was not whe ther the board of cl irecrors had 
maximized the va lue of lhc as :-; cts or of the firm. The fiduciary rr:gime 
addressed on ly the boc,rcl's goud f;:;. ith in iJursuit of value fur the 
comrnon stock interes t: 
Vlhat is clear is that the CJ~ rr tc~ board \Vas striving to maxirnize tht~ 
possibili ty of th e cornmon st cJCl.:: pa rtici pat ing in some "upside"' ben efit 
fro m the ccmmcrcial de\ ·c: !opment of th e com pany's i,l t,.: lkcwai 
pro pert ies . lt is clear too tha t the course it took to do that argu ably was 
superior to an alternati\' t~ in which the preferred acqui re d umtroL 
because th e prd.crred had a financia l ince ntive to liquid a te the finn 
immediate ly. th us de priving the common of any currem va lue . Thus, 
unlike two competing cash transactions or transaction in which wi de ly 
traded securities are offered . t he alte rnat ives that plain tiff poses are rich 
with legitimate . in deed unavoidable. occasions for the exercise of good 
faith business judgment. 
[This is not) a situ a tion in wh ich. from the commo n stock's perspe ct ive. 
"there is no tomorro\v.'' and the board ought not be recognized as having 
discre tion to p re fer what it sees as a '' longer term va lue" o ver a hi gher 
present va lue . The court would have no basis to conclude that the 
immedia te value of the comm on would in fac t be greater had an 
a lte rnative of the kind presented by the preferred somehow been put in 
pl ace . ... 11 4 
In effect, the Delaware court here declined to use fiducia ry iaw as 
the basis for implying a maximizing control transfer mechanism. In so 
doing it acted in accord with the structure of American fiduciary la w. 
The law's charge to the corporate board to work diligently and loyally 
to enhance value is phrased in terms of the overall " firm" only in 
general articulations i 15 or in cases where the effect is to strengthen 
management's hand against a hostile tender offer for the common 
-----------·-------- --
113. Eq ui ty-Linke d in ve stors . L P. v. Adams. 705 A .2cl1040. 1057 (De l. Ch. 1997) . 
114. !d. at 1058-59. 
115. See. e.g .. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CO RPORATE GOVERNANCE: A>i ,\ L YSIS AND 
RECOM!YI ENDATIONS § 2.01 (199-q . 
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stock. 110 Where board decisions implicate conflicting interests of 
classes of equity securities (or conflicting interests of debt and equity 
securities), and management acts to advance the interests of the 
common stockholders, the value to be maximized becomes the value 
of the common stock. 
This alignment between fiduciary obligation and the common 
stock's interest reflects first-generation agency theory. which held that 
the residual interest holder has the value-maximizing incentive in all 
going-concern situations outside the vicinity of insolvency. 117 The 
CTM's primary lesson for the law is that this assumption is not nearly 
f. 1 1 1' 1 . l ]] 
0 
as sa east 1e corporate aw 1terature seems tot 11n ..:.. 
The legal primacy of the common stock interest also reflects 
institutional concerns. In a hypothetical alternative regime, the board 
is charged with maximizing firm value whatever the allocational 
consequences among classes of securityholclers. 110 Information 
asymmetries between the boardroom and the courtroom make 
intervention to enforce such an open-ended maximization duty 
impracticable. Courts do not have the technical wherewithal to review 
corporate boards on the substance of their business decisions. They 
prefer to limit inspection to process contexts, which implicate facts and 
factors more immediately intelligible and amenable to judicial 
reviewY0 The courts also accord the board a wide zone of discretion in 
which to resolve pie-slicing disputes among different classes of 
securityholder. For example, had the Genta board decided in good 
faith and upon clue diligence that the game was up - that the Aries 
deal was one-sided and unlikely to lead to a turnaround and to put the 
firm to the preferred in accord with their contract - the common 
l16. The reference is to corporate law's constituency statutes. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-756(d) (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 23·1·35-l(f) (West Supp. 2001): N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001-02). 
ll7. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Atw!vsis uf rile Various Ruriona!es for 1Vfaking 
Sharelzulders 1he Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corpomre Fiduciarv Duties. 21 STETSON L. REV. 
23 (1991). Distress situations are the exception. There the equity has a number of perverse 
incentives that can lead to reduction in the value of the finn's producing assets. See Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co .. 1991 WL 277613. at *33 & 
n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
l18. For a contrasting economic approach to the same endpoint. sec Thomas A. Smith. 
The Efficient Norm j(Jr Corporare Lmv: A Neorruditiunal!nterprerlllion of' Fiduciarv Dutv. 9:-\ 
MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999). . . ~ 
119. Morey W. McDanieL Bondholders and Stockho!dns. 13 J. CORP. L. 205 ( 1998): 
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corpomre Coverllinlce. 4l Bus. LAW 413 ( l98o). 
l20. See Paramount Communications. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc .. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1993), where the Delaware Supreme Court moves Rev/on review away from business 
substance in the direction of process review. Under QVC the question is less whether the 
board maximizes value than whether the board informed itself of available alternative 
courses of action respecting value maximization. 
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stockholders would have been hard pressed to articulate an action for 
breach of fiduciary duty. 12 1 
The foregoing justification of the ruling in Equity-Linked 
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, hc)\vever, leaves open some problems. Since 
Genta was in distress, governance in the common's interest was not 
presumptively efficient. Furthermore. the court could have ruled for 
the preferred without instituting an urnvorkable fiduciary regime. 
Genta's delaying actions respecting Nasdaq delisting easily could have 
been characterized as a breach of the contractua l duty to act in good 
faith. The contract accorded the preferred a ri ght of redemption in the 
event of delisting; but lor the board's inte rvention with Nasd aq. the 
delisting would have occurred. perfecting the right. 122 Since the act ion 
frustrated the exercise of the right , it arguably violated the contract 
law good faith duty in its narrower articulation, under which the duty 
protec ts perfo rmance of th e contract 's explicit terms on ly and 
implicates no broad, fid uciary-like duty of se lf-abnegation. The 
foregoing characterization of the Adams situation is well within the 
narrow statement of the duty, a formulation held applicable to senior 
securities in Delaware cases. 123 
It should be emphasized that the good faith rule referenced here is 
a special rule that applies only to debt and preferred stock contracts. It 
bears only the most tenuous familial relationship with the duty of good 
fai th described in the R estatement 2d and taught in first year courses. 
The Restatement's good faith standard invites aggressive application to 
protect contract parties in positions of disadvantage. It constrains 
opportunism to protect expectations. 12~ A variant of this standard 
applies when an interpreting judge concl udes that the contract 
contains no term dictating a result on the facts of the case. In such an 
"omitted term" case, the decisionmaker is invited to interpolate a term 
fo llowing from community standards of fairness. Once again 
aggressive intervention is invited.
125 
Two decades ago, plaintiffs invited 
courts to apply these precepts aggressively to protect holders of bonds 
and preferred stock. Instead, beginning with the famous case of Broad 
121. Compare Orban v. Field. 1997 WL 153831 (De l. Ch. Apr. 1. 1997). a venture capita l 
case in which the court sustains the board 's action to wipe out a common stockholde r in 
favor of preferred classes ho lding a majo rity of the votes . 
122 . H ad the Genta board taken no steps to delay. de listing would have occurred in 
ea rly December 1996. 705 A.2d 1040. I 047 (1997). De lilying tilctics caused dcli st ing to be 
delayed until Fe bruary 4. 1997; the Genta boilrd approved the A ries deal on Janumy 28. 
1997./r/. at 1051-52 & n.34. 
123. Simons v. Cogan. 542 A.2cl 7i:l5 (Del. Ch. 1987) ; Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc .. 508 A .2d 
873 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
124 . R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 cmt. a (1981). 
125 . !d.~ 204 cmt. d . 
Michigan Lavv RevieH' [Voi. ]()0:891 
v. Rock;vefl internotional, 12h the courts invented a restnct1ve variant, 
pmsuant to which the good faith duty is not breached unless an 
articula u:d contract right has been violated. In rnost situations, this 
bond and preferred good faith rule negates the Restatement's good 
fRith regirnc. Good faith is a backstop duty intended to come to bear 
to protect parties who do not have specific contract provisions to 
them. In the vast majority of cases, to require a contract term 
first is to say .. no good faith duty." But there remains a subset of cases 
in which the bond and preferred good faith variant assists a victim of 
Adams is in this subset. 1' 7 
unatcly for VC this is a small :'ubsct. The drafting burden on 
p referred ren1ains so onerous as to rnake the little good faith 
tectiu11 held out in the cases more theoretical than real. The judges 
the terms of preferred stock contre1cts give the benefit of any 
doubts to the common. Part of the burden stems from the fact that in 
Dela\vare corporate politics often matter more than statements of 
doctrine. Corporate politics have not historically favored preferred 
claims because managers, who decide where to charter the firm, tend 
to be the actors with political influence. Accordingly, contingencies 
must be predicted with prescience and provided for in painstaking 
detail if the preferred's expectations are not to be frustrated. 
Is this an efficient approach? The law of preferred stock thereby 
tracks the law and economics that refuses implied-in-fact and implied-
in-law protections to corporate participants on the ground that in the 
long run forcing them to negotiate contracts leads to efficient results. 
But, as we have seen, 12s this rationale is questionable. The complete 
contingent claims contract that the law thus demands as a vehicle for 
protecting preferred in the absence of boardroom control arguably is 
an economic impossibility. Preferred stock contracts traverse a 
considerable expanse of noncontractible territory. Of course, we also 
have seen that noncontractibility is not an absolute - the CTM, for 
example, designs a contract term that indirectly steers the parties 
toward an optimal solution of a noncontractible problem. But this also 
is exac lly what the parties did in Adams, drafting a redemption 
provision based on Nasdaq delisting. It is true that VC in Adams could 
have l~xtracted a further explicit provision, one to the effect that E 
would not actively seek to delay Nasdaq delisting. At this point, 
hovvever, the forced contracting norm arguably has led us to an absurd 
126. 6.+2 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane), ccrr. denied. 454 U.S. 965 (1981): see 
n/s(J Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
!27. For a second example, see J-JB Korenvaes Investmenrs, L.P. v. lvfurriort Corp., 1993 
VvL 257422 (Del. Ch. Jul. 1. 1993) (showing that anticlilution provisions governing an issue of 
convertible prderrcd can fail on some fact patterns. requiring intervention under the good 
fa ith rule). 
128. See supm text accompanying notes 34-35. 
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result. After all, there i~.; no such thing as a case where the dra fte r ot a 
specific contract term could not have been even more specific. 
The resulting message is disturbing: contractual specifications 
designed to protect prefe rred are intrimically unreliable beca use 
reviewing courts welcome the open ing of loopholes on behalf of the 
common stock. B ut for VC the upshot is clear: the only reliable 
contracting course is to take boardroom control, full or shared. Such a 
narrowing of the menu of meaningful contractual choices cannot 
possibly be efficient. 
2. Conrm! 11! ihe Sh urehulders · i'vi eeiing 
In the usual corporate power allocation , the board ot di rectors 
manages the busin ess ,; nrl the shareholders e lect the board. ~:~·J 
Shareholder approval also i :~ needed for charter amendments, many 
mergers, sales o f all or substantially a ll assets, and liquiclarions .1-'11 
Preferred stockholders also run into difficulties with respect to 
exercises of this shareholder legisla tive function. 
To see why, consider a stylized retelling of the facts of Bove v. 
Community Hotel Corp. ~:1 1 This case concerned a corporation with an 
issue of preferred on which no dividends had been paid for twenty-
four years. The face amount of cumulated dividend arrearages was 
greater than the going concern value of the entire equity of the finn. 
The board of directors determined to eliminate the arrearages, 
ostensibly to make the firm a more attractive vehicle for debt 
financing. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, boards in this 
position effected elimination of accumulated arrearages by 
engineering direct amendments of their firms' charters. A conceptual 
anomaly made this possible. The "preferred stock contract," unlike a 
contract governing corporate debt, is a part of the firm's charter. The 
charter, in turn, is subject to a statutory process directive respecting 
the power to amend. In the early twentieth century, most state 
corporate codes provided that a simple majority vote of all 
outstanding shares was sufficient to approve a charter amendment. 
Literally applied, this meant that where (a) an issue of preferred stock 
did not carry a majority of the votes of all issues of stock, and (b) the 
preferred issue had been created without a special charter term 
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. ~ 141(a) (2001) . 
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. ~~ 242.251.271.275 (20Cll). 
13 l. 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 196LJ) . In the actual case. direct amendment of the: preferred stock 
con trac t required a 100% approval by the preferred and the merger required a class vote ot' 
the preferred . The re telling in the text substitutes the scenario that would have followed 
under today 's Delaware statute . For a more recent example, see E!lioil Assocs., L.P. v. 
Avatex Corp .. 715 A.2d 843 (Del 1998). 
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req uiring a separate vote of the preferred as a class to approve charter 
amend ments implicating its interests, the rights and preferences of the 
prefe rred were subject to ex post stripping for the benefit of the 
common through use of its charter amendm ent power. This was seen 
as unfair, and many state courts invalid ated such act ions o n a 
constit utiona l property rights theory. But that judicial theory becam e 
moribunc\. 1"2 
In response, sta te legisla tures adjusted state corporate codes , 
including Delaware's, so as to afford the preferred a process 
protection . A majority vote of a given class of stockhold e rs would be 
req uired whenever a charter amendme nt impaired that classes · 
contrac t rights. 1 ~ 3 The preferred issuer in B()\,'C . howeve r. found a way 
to avo id that preferred class vote. Its board set up a shelL wholly 
owned subs idiary and e ngin eered the merger of the iss uer corporation 
into the she ll subsid iary. Under the ''merger agreeme nt" between the 
two corporat ions, the com mon stock of the surviving corporation 
wo uld be iss ued to both the common and the preferred ot the issuer 
firm in proportions therein specified. Unde r the specificatio n , the 
unde rwate r common came away with a sli ce of firm value. The 
"merger agreement" thus had the effect of stripping value from the 
rights of the preferred specified in the charte r. Here the managers in 
Bove exploited a second legal anomaly: in a merge r the charter of the 
transferor corpora tion is replaced by the charter of the surviving 
corporation. A merger, accordingly, is a charter-amending event. 
T he me rger in Bove had to be submitted for shareholder approva l. 
But the state code req uired a class vote of the preferred in the case of 
a charter arnendment injurio us to the prefe rred, but required only a 
vo te of all the shareho ld ers as one class for a m erger. In effect , the sole 
purpose of the m erger into the shell subsidi ary was to provide a 
vehicle for recapita lizing the firm's equity a nd e liminating the 
preferred arrearages without a class vote of the preferred be ing 
req uired. Yet the state court sustained the merger. That the m erger 
was e ngineered sole ly for the purpose of e limin ating the arrearages 
a nd that the sta tute provided for a class vote (and veto) in its 
instructions respecting the direct means to the e nd was neither here 
nor there . Under corporate law's "doctrine of inde pendent lega l 
significance ," first articula ted in Delaware in a similar case, different 
sections of the corporate code are to be read literally and 
independently. A policy implication of one secti o n does not provide a 
co urt a basis for implying a limitation on the utilization of anoth er 
section. Accordingly , the provision for a class vote on changes 
132. See supra tex t accompanying note 100. 
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2001). Even with a class vote. publicly traded 
preferred has been known to approve right-stripping amendments. See, e.g .. Bowma n v. 
A rmour & Co .. 160 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1959). 
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injurious to the preferred's interest in the charte r amendme nt section 
of the code does not imply a general rule that preferred may in no 
circumstances have its rights stripped absent a class vote. A s a result , 
the merger section may be used to strip preferences from preferred 
because it literally does not provide for class vote even th ough 
preference stripping was the only purpose of the me rger. 
In gene ral, state corpo rate codes are not inte rpreted to possess 
policy coherence. No embarrass me nt stems from the resulting 
interpreti ve anomalies. Instead , they a re ce lebrated because th ey lend 
freedom of action to insiders. 
Once again, the message [o r pre fe rred holders is ge t a better 
contract. And indeed, pre fe rred ca n contract aro und the Bove 
problem with a provision in the charter for a class vote in conn ection 
with merge rs . 13~ But such provisions are rare in chart er provisions 
governing publicly issued pre fe rred. A study conducted in the late 
1980s of charters governing preferred iss ued by De !aware 
corporations and listed on the New York Stock Exchange found that 
only 14% required a class vote in respect of a m erger. 135 Many issuers 
have taken advantage of this failure to draft carefully , successfully 
structuring mergers that transfer value from the preferred to the 
common. 
The Delaware courts have supported the issuers and their value 
transfers. They ruled in the touchstone case of Rothschild v. Liggett 
that preferred can be cashed out in a merger for substantially less than 
its liquidation preference, a "merger" not being "liquidation" even 
where the particular class of stock is being cashed out in the merger.u6 
Elsewhere , Delaware has sanctioned a merger where the managers of 
th e transferor firm bargained clown the consideration first offered for 
the preferred by the acquiring firm even as they bargained up the 
consideration on offer for the common. 137 Finally, in Delaware the 
exercise of drafting a charter that actually provides for a class vote in a 
merger has proved to be a game played by secret rules. In Warner 
Comnwnicntions Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. , 1 ~.s the court held 
that a provision requiring a two-thirds class vote to alter any 
preferences, rights, powers or privileges of the preferred did not 
operate in respect of a merger, even though the charter had a separate 
134. Some sta tes. such as New York. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 903(a)(2)(8) (McKinney 
Supp. 2002), provide for a cla ss vo te. De laware does no t. DEL. CODE A NN . tit. 8, § 251 
(2001 ). 
135. N ote, Arrearage E!iminmion an d rlze Preferred Srock Conrracr: A Survev and a 
Proposalfor Reform. 9 CA RDOZO L. R EV. 1335 ( !988). 
136. Roth schild lnfl Corp. v. Ligge tt Group. 474 A.2cl 133 (Del. 1984). 
137. D alton v. Am. In v. Co. , 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985). 
138. 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
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firms moderate it by staging E 's draw clowns of capitaL 1 ''' by 
diversifying their portfolios of investments in startup firms, by 
syndicating investments in particular firms, and by closely monitoring 
their positions. 1 ~0 vVhen a particular investment does turn out to be a 
complete failure. the contract structures priorities to allocate any 
crumbs le tt on the table to VC.
1511 
But these often do not amount to 
much. 
Suboptimal or mediocre performance short ot complete failure 
presents a less tractable problem, although not so much so with 
venture capital portfolio companies as with mature preferred issuers. 
vVith startup firms, indifferent results can lead directly to the disaster 
scenario. Outside capital is needed for survival and poor results mean 
that capital is cut off, given staged investment. In contrast_ poorly 
performing mature firms can survive for years. with the option of 
omitting to pay dividends on preferred being a factor assisting in that 
surviva l. There are also drastic differences in duration between senior 
securities issued by mature firms and venture capital preferred. The 
preferred that concerned Graham and Dodd was issued in the early 
and mid-twentieth century, before the inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. 
In those clays , preferred stocks often had no mandatory redemption 
schedule and thus, like common, had an indefinite cluration. 151 Venture 
capital preferred tends to take an intermediate term, with a duration 
of four to six years. 152 When the time is up, redemption rights become 
exercisable, and the mediocre performer still limping along either 
finds replacement capital or becomes a disaster case. 
Mediocrity between startup and year five is a problem less easily 
treated through advance specification. When value lies on the table 
unmaximized, by definition a governance problem exists , although not 
necessarily a verifiable one. As we have seen, the solution turns on 
intervention by VC to replace E as CEO, and venture capital contracts 
in most cases deal with this problem either by vesting boardroom 
control in VC, or by making sure that boardroom control remains 
contestable. Given the latter situation, and a neutral outside director 
with a deciding vote, opportunistic stripping of preferred rights and 
preferences seems unlikely. Even if such a resolution passes in the 
boardroom, the VC is safe so long as it possesses voting control at 
shareholders' meetings. Kaplan and Stromberg's numbers on voting 
control thus show us that the preferred stock problem is solved in 
1-+E\. Sahlman. supra note 7, at 507. 
l4LJ. GO MPERS & LERNER. supm note 71. at 139-202. 
l:'\0. Some ve nture capital firms have members who specialize in this downsid e cleanup 
function. I owe this point to Professor Marcus Cole. 
!51. Morey McDanieL Sinking Fund Preferred Stock. 13 FIN. MGT. 45-52 (Spring 1984). 
152. Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 12. 
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70.8% of cases with no vest ing of E equity and 55.8% with full vesting. 
Since the preferred stock problem tends to arise in e,, states and 
vesting is unlikely to be full in those states, stripping of VC 
preferences and o the r downside opportunism turns out to be a 
possibility in about on e-third of the cases. But it a lso should be noted 
that mergers and acquisitions occur in 9~ stales as well. So the 
possibility of stripping s till exists in the 45 % of ful l vesting cases where 
VC does not have vo ting con tro l. 
To what extent are these minority-vote VCs threatened by 
opportunism from majority vote Es due to their status as preferred 
holders? Th e pr imary limitations on exposure are built into the 
transactions· overall economic structure. These dea ls have a limited, 
intermediate term, with E being requi red to ra ise cash to redeem the 
preferred in e" states. Prior to liquidati on . boardroom control remains 
contestable in 58°ft> of the cases where the VC docs not have voting 
control. So the window fo r opportunism opens in on ly a minority of 
cases and stays open for only a short period. Of course, A dams shows 
how a majority-vote E can strip value even during this short period. 
The degree to which value and rights can be stripped in this 
minority of cases depends on fine points of contracting practice. The 
literature shows that standard ven ture capital preferred contracts 
provide for class votes in respect of adverse charter amendments, 
increases in the number of authorized shares, and the authorization of 
preferred classes of higher priority. 153 Mergers are treated separate ly 
under a one-size-fits-all term. A merger is treated as a liquidation, 
triggering a right to redeem the preferred if the ''stockholders of the 
Company immediately prior to [closing of the transaction] own less 
than 50% of the Company's voting power" thereafter. If the merger is 
treated as a liquidat ion, a class vote also is provided for. If the merger 
is not treated as a liquidation, no class vote is provided for. 154 
This one-size-fits-all term is substantially effective, even as it falls a 
step short of perfection. The term manifestly is designed to overrule 
Rothschild v. Liggett's ruling that a cash-out merger is not a 
liquidation. 155 Where all of the shares of the transferor firm in the 
merger are cashed out, the term manifestly achieves its intended 
purpose. The preferred liquidation rights become immediately 
153. See Dauchy. supra note 75 . at 315; see also Hank Barry. Negotillling Prelimin11ry 
Financing, in 20TH A NNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 849. 860 (PLI Patents. 
Copyright, Trade marks. and Literary Property. Course Handbook Series No. 590. 2000) . 
154. El len B. Corenswet e t al. , Venture Capiw/ Considermions in /v!ergers and 
Acquisitions, in HAN DLI NG MERGERS & ACQU ISITIONS IN HI GH-TECH 1\ND EM ERGING 
GROWTH ENVIRONM ENTS 1999. at 655. 661 -62 (PLI Corp. L & Prac ., Course H andbook 
Series No. 1122. 1999): Dauchy, supra note 75 , a t 317: Richard R Plumridge, Typic11/ 
Venrure Capital Transaction Docu!llenls. in PRIVATE PLACEM ENTS 2001. at 817, 856-57 (PLI 
Corp. L. & Prac .. Course Handbook Se ries No. 1239, 2001). 
155. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
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exercisable, and the preferred gets a class vote that allows it to veto 
the merger. But the preferred with a minority of the overstl sh<clfe s will 
not be protected under thi s provision in all cases. I-l e re are three 
examples. 
(a ) X Co . has 6,000 shares of common outstanding held bv E 
amounting to 60 % of its totai shares ( 6.000 total)~ 4,000 shares ( 40 % ) 
of preferred are held by VC. T he liquidation V0.lue of the p re ferr ed is 
$100 (or $400.000). X Co.'s total value is $.500,000. J\.cquir ing finn A 
Cu., whi ch is controlled by the third director of )( Co., organizes a 
shell acq uisition subsidiary, A Sub. which issues to A Co. 5.000 
common shares. A Sub merges into X Co. pursuant to a merger 
agreement providing that 5Jl00 of the 6,000 X Co . cornmon shares :_ue 
to he converted into $40 cash. T he o ther LOOU X c·o . common ::; hares 
arc left to ride , <:l S are the p refe rred shares. T he shares of A Su b me 
converted into 5,000 common shares of X Cu. Simultaneously with th e 
closing of the merger, X Co. borrows the $200,000 to be paid to its 
common stock in the merger, giving the lender a note and mortgage 
on X Co.'s property. A Co. also takes a long-term option to buy the 
remaining 1,000 shares of X Co. for $20. 
In this deal, when the shooting stops, the acquirer has bought 
exactly SO% of the target common, thereby avoiding trigger ing 
liquidation. The preferred has no incentive to convert to common 
prior to the closing since the value of the X Co. into which it would 
convert is less than its liquidation preference. The preferred is better 
off holding to maturity. A Co. is doing a leveraged speculation on an 
increase in X Co.'s equity value, using the assets of X Co. as a 
borrowing base and putting in no significant capital of its own. It must 
delay purchase of the remaining 10% of X Co. to avoid triggering 
liquid at ion and a class vote. But it can bide its time on that purchase 
-the remaining common has no incentive to defect to the side of the 
VC in internal votes. As in Adams, the VC cannot block the borrowing 
unless a debt covenant is included in the preferred s tock contract. 
Withou t a debt covenant, and assuming both liquidation at maturity 
and that X Co. st ill is worth only $500,000, VC now receives $300,000 
rather than $400,000. Its equity upside rides largely unaffected. 
The convoluted structure of the hypothesized merger shows that 
the standard venture preferred merger provision is effective across a 
broad range of merger and acquisition territory: normally, the 
acquiring firm wants at least 51% of the vo ting equity. But the 
hypothetical also shows that a loophole can be opened in a pinch. 
W ith value on the ta ble to be stripped, that cannot be considered an 
event with a de minimis probabil ity. As to the use of business 
covenants which would block the borrmving in the forego ing 
hypothetical, the literature signals variations in practice. Some lawyers 
• 
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suggest that business covenants sho uld be included in the ·'investor 
rights agreement'" usually entered into between VC and E. 1'" O ther 
descriptions of stand ard d eal documentation ntak c~ no rncntion of 
business coven ants. T he Kaplan and Strc)mberg numbers indirect ly 
suggest tha t b usiness covenants are the exception rather than the rule. 
They report that 20 % of their cases involved con tract provisions 
continge nt on subsequent fin ancia l performance. hut none of the 
provisio ns they describe are negative covenants .1' 7 
(b) T he firm this time is Y Co ., with common h,;] d by E amounting 
to 60rYo of the shares (6 ,000 tot al) and the preferred held by VC 40% 
r J. oo· C) to tal) T h"" i; r·1'1 id ation valw' of the rw~ r"''·:· ,~ cl i ,. <r 1 r;'O (o~ \ · ~ .. , _._,. J..l ..... L - (._ ~ - .._, -' r - "- -"- ~...- t .._ \..,.._, ... ~) ~' L<.. . l_ 
$400,000) . The total value of Y Co. is $640.000. Y Co . me rges into B 
Co ., which has 6000 shares of common outstand ing prior to the 
.-~ ~ ] . d . . '1' ?: II) f)( \(\ --.~ , merger. l1ie tota~ rncrger cons1 erat1on IS ~hJL.-\~, .._ . .) _,_ 1 D 1 ~ lT!crgcr trea ts 
Y Co.'s two classes of stock d ifferent ially so tar as concerns 
considerat ion . Each share o f common gets one share of the surviving 
co rporation worth $80 per share if no prefe rred is converted prior to 
t he m erger; the stock is worth $64 if all of the preferred is converted 
prior to the merger. The preferred gets cash worth $40 per share. 
H ere , since more than 50 % of the stock of the surviving corporation is 
held by Y Co. holders , the liquidation/class vote provisio n is not 
triggered. Given a conversion privilege, the preferred can convert into 
common on a one-to-one basis prior to the merger closing. If all of the 
preferred converts 10,000 shares will share the merger consideration, 
which will thus be worth $64 per share . If the merger were a 
liquidation, the preferred wo uld have a r ight to rece ive $100 per share 
in cash. 
O nce again , the scenario is convoluted. T h is merger averts 
triggering the clause only because the acquiring corporation has the 
sam e n umber of common shares ou tstanding as the target. Post-
merger, Y Co. common and B Co. common each hold 6,000 shares. If 
VC converts , form er Y Co. investors hold 10,000 o f 16,000. Since , by 
hypothesis , the Y Co. shares are held by a handful of actors , control in 
effect passes to Y Co. actors, som e thing the fi rm in B Co.'s position is 
unlikely to coun tenance . It is more likely in the case of stock-for-stock 
deal like this that the B Co. holders end up with a clear m ajority . T hat 
156. P!umridge. :w pm note 154. at 647 ; Kathryn K. Li ndaue r. Crirical Issues in 
Nego tiating Venwre Capira! for rhe Sofiware D eveloprne/71 Company. in 19TH A NNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON COiviPUTER L.-\W 799. 321-22 (PLI Pate nts. Copy righ t. Tra dema rks. a nd 
Literary Pro pe rty. Course H a ndbook Serie s No . .547. 1999) . 
1.57. Kaplan & Stromberg . supm note 12 (v>'o rking pape r at l9 & tb l. 6) . !t is e ntire ly 
possible that Kapla n a nd Strom be rg were not looking to see if the investor rights agreeme nts 
in the ir transactio ns con ta ined business covena nts. It a lso is possible to d raft negative 
cove nan ts tha t do no t turn on fu t ure fin a nci a l pe rfonmlilce figures. O ne ca n. for exa m ple . 
complete ly fo rbid short term borrowing a nd funded de b t without regula ting it by refe re nce 
to a ba lance she e t test. 
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case , of course. triggers the clause . A ltern at ively, B Co. pays in cash, 
debt securiti es. nonvoting common, or a mix of any of those with 
vo ting stock. In all of those cases, the dea l in all probability triggers 
the clause. 
(c) O ne glaring loophole remains: the fact pattern of the Bove case 
desc ribed above. Th is time the firm is Z Co. It has 6000 shares of 
cummon outstanding held by E amounting to 60% of it s total sh a res 
(0,000 tota l); 4,000 shares (40 % ) of preferred are held by VC. The 
liquidation va lue of the preferred is $100 (or $400,000): the divide nds 
are cumu lat ive and $100.000 in arrears. Z Co. 's total va lue is $500.000. 
Z Co . crea tes a shell , wholly owned subsidiary, EZ Co rp .. and merges 
into it. Pursuant to the merger agreement (drafted by £) . the 
preferred and common of Z Co. are to rece ive common o f EZ Corp .. 
5,001 shares to the common and 4,999 sha res to the preferred. Since 
the vot ing stock of the surviving corporation is held by the same 
holders as the voting stock of the transferor corporation, the clause is 
not triggered and VC cannot block the deal under the contract. VC 
will have a plausible case for breach of fiduciary duty and will be able 
to bring an appraisa l proceeding pursuant to which it will be able to 
claim the value of its shares in cash. Both lawsuits are powerful 
weapons, but expensive. A roadblock built into the contract would be 
cheaper. 
O ne wonders why the drafters of venture capital documents have 
not taken the simple step of forbidding any and all mergers absent a 
preferred class vote. In a negotiation over such a term, the anticipated 
objection would be that across-the-board vetoes in VC create the ir 
own risk of opportunism- the VC with a veto can hold up the dea l so 
as to ex tract a disproportionately large consideration. But E already is 
taking that risk with respect to all deals entailing a control transfer, 
and the more fully drafted term does not materially enhance its 
exposure. 
C. Summary 
Whether the glass of protection for preferred stockholders on the 
middle ground between draw down and redemption is half empty or 
half full remains a question. The venture capital arrangements 
discussed here derive many of their features from the practice of sma ll 
business planning. Fitted to the startup firm 's closely held status , th ese 
contrac ts are intensely relat iona l as they simultaneously encourage 
entrepreneurs to maximize firm value while blocking opportunism 
against outside capital. They also refl ect the fact that venture 
capita lists are not passive inves tors. Portfolio companies look to them 
for management assistance and service as reputational intermediaries 
• 
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with custome rs and s uppli ers . 1 ' ~ No diffusion of this contracting 
patte rn to mature issu ers and the public securiti es markets which 
concerned Grah am and Dodd should be expected . 
CONCLUS IO"' 
This Article 's cho ice of incomplete contracts economics to describe 
ven ture capita l contracts has no rmat ive implicat ions . T he economics 
sugges t tha t ex post Coasian barga ining is no t a vehicle we ll suited to 
opt im al incentive a lignm ent in co rporct ti o ns. Accordingly , when 
governance disputes erupt , a se t o f instructiuns needs to come from 
som ewhere . T he economics a lso suggest a zo ne of preference for 
sha red con trol and process over adva nce speci fic at ion . Accordingly, 
instructions wi ll not always come in the form of advance contract 
specifications, and the legal system will be on ca ll to provide third-
party umpires. 
On the matter of judicial um piring, standard law and economics 
joins with the Delaware courts to counse l against intervention to 
protect re lational victims on the th eory that transacting par ties should 
be encouraged to specify eve ryth ing in advance in contracts. 
A lte rnative ly, when the interests of common and senior holders 
conflict, law and economics again joins with Delaware in presuming in 
favor of the common. Here the theory is that short of an extreme 
distress situation, value is maxi mized whe n management decisions are 
aligned with the interests of the residual risk holder. 
The incomple te contracts economics presented in this Article 
sugges ts a more circumspect approach. Where subject matter is 
noncontractible, a blanket presumption against ex post inte rvention 
on the gro und of forced contract is in coherent. Furthermore , the 
control transfer model shows that efficien t results an d the interests of 
senior securityholders arc aligned in a la rger se t of cases than 
previo usly supposed. When disputes betwee n venture capitalists and 
entreprene urs come to court, a ro tc presumption favoring the 
common stockh older is not defensible on efficiency grounds. 
A lega l case arises for better treatment of preferred. A s presented 
here , the case asks for very little. No new fiduciary duty has to be 
implied. No new corporate tort need be inven ted . Conventional 
contract law merely needs to be applied in an evenhanded way. So 
doing would only enhance the reviewing court's reputation for 
responsiveness to business interests. 
l5 S. Sah lm an, supro no te 7, a t 508. Fo r a forma l of the in te ra cti ve re lat ionship of 
ve nture ca pitali sts a nd entrepreneurs at the draw clown stage. see Rafael Re pull o & Javier 
Sua rez, Vemu rc Capira! Finan ce: A Securiry Dnign Approuc!z (SSRN Eke. Paper Co li. No. 
145 134, 1999). ar http://pape rs.ssrn .com/abstrac t= 145 134. 
